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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this thesis is to discuss a phenomenon in the reform era that 
historian Johanes Herlijanto called the Ethnic Chinese Social Movements in Indonesia. 
These movements began as independent reactions toward the May 1998 Anti-Chinese 
Riots and evolved into a series of social movements that call for the rights of ethnic 
Chinese as Indonesian citizens. The struggle indirectly reawakened a discourse 
regarding the position of ethnic Chinese minorities in the concept of Indonesian 
nationhood and nationalism, namely a discourse based on the concepts of assimilation 
and integration. This thesis will discuss how the Ethnic Chinese Social Movements 
have significant impacts in revising the understanding of Indonesian nationhood that 
was dominated by the New Order regime for 32 years.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 One of the most dynamic phenomena within the last ten years of post-Suharto 
Indonesia is what Chinese Indonesian historian Johanes Herlijanto calls “the 
emergence of Chinese Indonesian social movements”.1
In essence, these movements have been a collective response from the 
country’s Chinese communities to a notion referred to as The Chinese Problem in 
Indonesia. Its definition is unclear, and its usage has referred to various aspects related 
to political, economic, social, cultural, and nationhood issues. The only clear 
understanding of the term is that it carries negative connotations regarding Chinese 
Indonesians in the eyes of the majority. 
 This refers to a series of 
Chinese Indonesian activism to demand social, political, and cultural rights after being 
repressed for 32 years under President Suharto’s New Order regime (1966 to 1998). 
These movements emerged not long after Indonesia entered a new era of democratic 
political reforms following President Suharto’s resignation from office on May 21st, 
1998. 
During the Suharto era, the term The Chinese Problem was used officially as a 
fundamental assumption for various discriminatory policies aimed at assimilating the 
Chinese into mainstream Indonesian society, which the government believed would 
solve the “problem”. For the sake of assimilation, Chinese Indonesians were ordered 
to forego any practices associated with Chinese culture and adopted the local customs 
where they resided; at the same time they were not included in local and national 
politics, making them a politically impotent ethnic group. The New Order’s anti-
                                                 
1  Johanes Herlijanto, “The May 1998 Riots and the Emergence of Chinese Indonesians: Social 
Movements in the Post-Soeharto Era” (Paper presented at the 18th Conference of International 
Association of Historians of Asia (IAHA), Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, 6-10.12, 2004). 
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Chinese legislations, as these policies became to be known, legally discriminated 
against Chinese Indonesians in social, political, and cultural spheres. 
On the other hand, Suharto’s corrupt regime not only allowed the Chinese to 
prosper in the economic sector, which they have historically dominated, but also 
incorporated a select few of Chinese entrepreneurs to become financiers for key 
military officials loyal to the president, in exchange for government favors that 
allowed them to gain enormous wealth. Patron-client relationships between members 
of the government, military officials, and several Chinese entrepreneurs became one of 
the most scandalous public secrets in Suharto’s Indonesia, further tarnishing the image 
of Chinese Indonesians as a whole in the eyes of the public. In short, within the 32 
years of President Suharto’s rule, the position of ethnic Chinese Indonesians in society 
was largely paradoxical for being an economically powerful but politically weak 
ethnic group, making them visible and vulnerable at the same time.  
The Asian Financial Crisis that began in 1997 brought widespread social and 
political crises in to the nation that led to the violent end of the New Order regime in 
1998. Violence broke out in major Indonesian cities about a week before Suharto 
resigned in May 21st, eventually spreading throughout the archipelago and continuing 
sporadically for the next few years to come. Some of the most remembered violent 
incidents in Indonesia were those occurring in Jakarta, Solo, and Medan from the 13th 
to the 15th of May, when mobs of indigenous Indonesians targeted the Chinese 
populations of the cities. Chinese houses and properties were looted or burned, while 
mobs targeted Chinese men to be killed and women raped. Although there were also 
victims of other ethnic backgrounds, this tragedy has become known today as the May 
1998 Anti-Chinese Riots.  
Although Chinese Indonesians certainly had been violently targeted before, the 
May 1998 Anti-Chinese Riots were arguably the most traumatic to the uneasy Chinese 
3 
and non-Chinese relationship in recent history. It was also a turning point for the 
minority group to rethink their position in society. During the Suharto era Chinese 
Indonesians advocated political pacifism as the strategy to ensure government 
protection from the hostile non-Chinese population and from government officials 
themselves. Chinese Indonesians also adopted, although reluctantly, the government 
policy of cultural assimilation to the mainstream indigenous population. Yet, after the 
violence in May 1998, Chinese Indonesians realized that three decades of government 
assimilation policy had failed them, and therefore it was time to adopt a new strategy.  
The opportunity to do so came along with the coming of a new democratic era 
known as Era Reformasi or the Reform Era following the fall of Suharto in 1998. The 
new spirit of democracy encouraged formerly marginalized voices to reappear in 
public, partly as a celebration to the end of a repressive era. As a response, Chinese 
Indonesians once again emerged with their own social movements that promoted equal 
rights in social, political, and cultural spheres. Since then, equal rights for Chinese 
Indonesians has been a prominent issue in national discourse, gaining various 
responses from the government and the public, and has become one of the symbols of 
the new Indonesian democracy. 
 This thesis examines the contemporary social movements of Chinese 
Indonesians in order to understand the main motivation and thinking behind these 
movements, and particularly, the meaning of these movements to the identity of 
Chinese Indonesians. The central question of the thesis is the following: from the 
framework of nation building, toward which direction do these social movements tend 
to move. Do they promote Chinese rights on the basis that they are fellow Indonesian 
citizens that deserve equal rights as others? Or instead, do they instead promote their 
rights in order to strengthen their position as a distinct identity within Indonesian 
society, which can be described as an attempt to establish Chinese chauvinism. Based 
4 
on the author’s research and analysis, the thesis argues that the general trend of these 
movements are dominated by forces that advocate Indonesian national identity rather 
than emphasizing ethnic group interests that may be associated with Chinese 
chauvinism. This conclusion is based on observation and analysis of the various forms 
of activism within the last ten years.  
 The generic term “social movements” may include any activity that the 
advocate defines as a means to promote Chinese Indonesian interests, including those 
conducted by a single person or those by organizations of various sizes and scales in 
social, political, and cultural spheres. It may also include the participation of Chinese 
Indonesians in all levels of domestic politics, as many refer to the action itself as 
symbolic in its own right. This thesis, however, primarily focuses on the newly-
formed Chinese organizations, whom the author argues to be the primary agents of 
Chinese Indonesian activism. 
The thesis argument favoring the nationalistic orientation of the movements is 
based on several indications found in current movements. The most important 
indication is the resurrection of a philosophical discourse from Chinese Indonesian 
movements in the past between two groups, namely the integrationists and 
assimilationists. This discourse emerged among Chinese Indonesian activists during 
the brief period of liberal democracy in the pre-New Order era in defining what it 
means to be an Indonesian and how ethnic Chinese could fit in that definition. 
Integrationists believe that ethnic Chinese should be able to maintain their distinct 
Chinese cultures while still being accepted as Indonesians, just like other indigenous 
ethnic groups in Indonesia. Assimilationists, on the other hand, believe that the 
Chinese are not indigenous to the geographical entity of the nation and thus must 
assimilate themselves to the indigenous culture and way of life. This thesis will further 
5 
explain the background of this debate and how each approach has its share of effect on 
the Chinese Indonesian community in modern Indonesian history.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
THEORETICAL APPROACH 
 
It is important to have a clearer understanding about how the term 
“assimilation” is understood in the context of the ethnic Chinese Indonesian discourse. 
Oxford Dictionary of Sociology defines the term as “the process by which an outsider, 
immigrant, or subordinate group becomes indistinguishably integrated into the 
dominant host society” where “the subordinate group actually came to accept and 
internalize the values and culture of the dominant group.” 2
 The majority’s pressure for the minority to assimilate was apparent in 
American society in the early 20th century, which was a period of major immigration 
influx into the United States. In their book, Richard Alba and Victor Nee associate the 
“old formulation” of assimilation in American society with ethnocentrism as it 
“elevates a particular cultural model, that of middle-class Protestant whites of British 
ancestry, to the normative standard by which other groups are to be assessed and 
toward which they should aspire.”
 What is not emphasized in 
the definition above is that in many cases the majority pressures the minority groups to 
undergo such process.  
3 This type of expectations in mainstream American 
society at the time had “overlooked the value and sustainability of minority cultures 
and, in addition, masked barely hidden ethnocentric assumptions about the superiority 
of Anglo-American culture.”4
                                                 
2 Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, “Assimilation,” enotes.com, 
 The American “old formulation” is an example of how 
defining assimilation in subjective manner risks the tendency to demean the minority’s 
socio-cultural identity, a tendency that is also inherent in how post-independent 
http://www.enotes.com/oxsoc-
encyclopedia/assimilation. 
3 Richard Alba and Victor Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary 
Immigration, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 4. 
4 Ibid. 
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Indonesian government and society defined assimilation toward the ethnic Chinese 
population. 
 However, what makes the Indonesian notion of assimilation toward the ethnic 
Chinese different from the American experience is not necessarily because 
Indonesians assume that their indigenous cultures are necessarily more superior to 
others. The pressure was more based on the notion that non-Indonesian, particularly 
Chinese, socio-cultural practices represent ambiguous ideological and political 
affiliations to the concept of Indonesian nationalism. In other words, the majority’s 
pressure for the Chinese to assimilate is inherently nationalistic in character, which is 
in many ways the historical product of two series of events, namely colonialism and 
the Cold War era.   
 The colonial period should receive particular attention due to its major role in 
shaping the social settings in post-colonial nation-states. Certainly, colonial experience 
was not unique to Indonesia as all Southeast Asian nation-states were essentially 
“shaped” by the period.5
 Scholars in the field of Southeast Asian Studies have categorized several types 
of interactions between the Chinese minority and the indigenous majority that 
 It was also during this period when Chinese immigration 
occurred in large numbers and thus Chinese population began to grow throughout the 
region. Yet, one of the most interesting aspects about the Southeast Asian Chinese 
discourse is the fact that, in post-colonial period, different governments have imposed 
different policies regarding ethnic Chinese population in each country. The immediate 
question would be why this is the case. The answer lays in the different historical 
experience among the Overseas Chinese communities as subjects of different colonial 
powers in the past.  
                                                 
5 Thongchai Wichinakul’s seminal work Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation a 
systematic explanation on the effect of colonialism to the geographical, and therefore psychological, 
establishment of modern Thailand and Southeast Asian nation-states in general. 
9 
occurred in different Southeast Asian countries. On the one extreme is the experience 
of the Chinese in Malaysia who are subjected to the government policy of 
accommodation. The Oxford Dictionary of Sociology defines the term 
“accommodation” as a process of interaction where “the subordinate group simply 
conformed to the expectations of the dominant group.”6 According to Vidhu Verma, 
Malaysia’s accommodation policy is in many ways constitutional, as the constitution 
rejected “the model of a secular, pluralist Malaysia based on equal rights of all citizens 
by providing special privileges to Malays.”7 The Constitution reflects the reality of 
Malaysia’s plural society, which is described by Verna as that in which “the public 
sphere is a space where ethnic and religious allegiances are dominant and remain 
largely unchallenged.”8 The constitutional categorization of social groups that enables 
the Malay-dominated government to adopt an affirmative action policy for “the 
economically backward” Malay majority is clearly a major legacy of the colonial 
period.9
 On the other extreme is the experience of ethnic Chinese communities in 
Thailand, a nation that was never colonized by European power. Ann Maxwell Hill 
argued that the Overseas Chinese communities may have the most successful 
assimilation into Thai society as “with each successive generation, there are 
proportionately more individuals in this group who choose to identify themselves as 
Thai more often.”
 
10
                                                 
6 (Oxford Dictionary of Sociology) 
 She continued, ”this model of generational assimilation points 
7 Ibid, 55 
8 Ibid. 
9 Vidhu Verma, Malaysia: State and Civil Society in Transition, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Inc.) 2002, 54 
10 Ann Maxwell Hill, “The Chinese in Northern Thailand: A Preliminary Perspective on Kinship and 
Ethnicity,” in The Overseas Chinese: Ethnicity in National Context, ed. Francis L.K. Hsu and Hendrick 
Serrie (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1998), 47. 
10 
toward the eventual extinction of a recognizably Chinese community in Thailand.”11
 
 
Prominent scholar G. William Skinner in his definitive 1957 book describes the 
acceptance of the Thai majority toward the distinguishably ethnic Chinese citizens: 
“The only fourth-generation Chinese who ever identify as Chinese are 
likewise Chinese-educated. The implication is clear that without a Chinese 
education grandchildren of Chinese immigrants at the present time become 
Thai… It is an interesting feature of Thai psychology that no matter how 
strong the prejudice against “those Chinese,” the Thai are never inclined to 
reject anyone of Chinese ancestry who speaks and behaves like a Thai.”12
 
 
 The absence of colonial power in the country’s history, which allow the 
indigenous majority to always be the politically dominant group, may have a major 
role in the successful process of amalgamation between the ethnic Chinese minority 
and the Thai majority.  
 The case of the ethnic Chinese in the Philippines is more complex compare to 
those in Malaysia and Thailand and perhaps is more similar to those in Indonesia, 
since there are many sub-groups that may or may not be regarded in social terms as 
“Chinese.” The Chinese’s experience as Spanish colonial subjects was turbulent as 
they faced more restrictions from the Spanish colonial government compare to those 
living in other colonial territories.13 However, according to George Weightman, 
“probably nowhere else in Southeast Asia – except in traditional Siam – was it more 
easy for the Chinese and their mestizo descendants to escape such restrictions and 
merge often as a new elite with the local society.”14
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
 Furthermore, Weightman 
12 G. William Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), 381. 
13 George H. Weightman, “The Chinese in the Philippines: From Aliens to Cultural Minority,” in The 
Overseas Chinese: Ethnicity in National Context, ed.Francis L.K. Hsu and Hendrick Serrie (Lanham, 
Maryland: University Press of America, 1998), 70. 
14 Ibid. 
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continued, unlike the Peranakan Chinese of Indonesia, the mestizo children were 
considered as “Filipinos – legally, socially, and culturally.”15
 What about the ethnic Chinese living in Indonesia? As mentioned earlier, the 
main policy regarding ethnic Chinese was the policy of assimilation. What this study 
argues, however, is that the Chinese community in Indonesia have experienced a 
transition from the pressure to assimilate to a period that allow them to simply 
integrate with the society as a whole. Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines integration 
as ”incorporation as equals into society or an organization of individuals of different 
groups.”
 
16
 
 The importance of this definition is that it does not mention any specific 
criteria for the different group to be incorporated into the mainstream. This notion of 
integration began to appear in national consciousness in the dawn of the democratic 
reform era in May 1998, and it was this notion that becomes the central doctrine of the 
ethnic Chinese Indonesian social movements in promoting equal rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, “Integration,” Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/integration (accessed October 2, 2009) 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ETHNIC TENSION: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter examines the history of the Chinese community in the colonial 
setting before the rise of nationalism at the dawn of the 20th century. Its primary aim is 
to explain the historical construction of long-lasting ethnic tensions between Chinese 
and the indigenous Indonesian ethnic groups known collectively as the Pribumi.  
As Fryer and Jackson indicated, The Chinese Problem can be found elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia where it is “largely a compound of mutual lack of understanding, 
suspicion, and hostility.”17
 
 What is unique about the Indonesian case, however, is that 
the notion has ultimately become an official term used in post-colonial government 
policies, some of which will be presented and analyzed in later chapters. The official 
definition of The Chinese Problem has never been clearly determined, but it is 
applicable to any negative connotation directed toward the Chinese. This reflects the 
intensity of ethnic tension in Indonesian society, and therefore it is important to 
thoroughly examine the history of this troubled relationship. By analyzing the history 
of the interaction (or lack of interaction thereof) between the indigenous and the 
Chinese community in Indonesia, one can see what the common themes associated 
with the Chinese Problem are, which are essential to fully understand the rhetoric 
behind the New Order regime’s assimilation policy. 
A Historical-Demographic Overview 
According to Dudley Poston, Michael Mao and Mei-Yu Yu, by around 1990 
there were approximately 37 million overseas Chinese in the world residing in 136 
                                                 
17 Donald W. Fryer and James C. Jackson, Indonesia (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1977), 
 259. 
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countries - 32.3 million of which, or eighty-eight percent, are located in 32 Asian 
countries.18 Two thirds of the 32.3 million live in four Asian countries, in which about 
7.3 million lived in Indonesia, 6 million in Thailand, 5.7 million in Hong Kong (now 
part of China), and 5.5 million in Malaysia.19
The geographic distribution of the Chinese population, however, is uneven 
throughout the archipelago. For instance, according to The Encyclopedia of Chinese 
Overseas, in 1998 the Chinese made less than 2 percent of the Eastern part of 
Indonesia’s population, while being nearly one-fourth of the population of Bangka 
Island; in Jakarta they were estimated to consist about 10 percent of the population, in 
Medan about 12 percent, and Pontianak about 30 percent.
 Although the Chinese make only about 3 
percent of Indonesia’s population of more than 200 million, based on this analysis, 
Indonesia in the early 1990s had the largest ethnic Chinese population in the world 
outside China and Taiwan.  
20 In terms of total numbers 
of Chinese population in Indonesia, the bulk of Chinese population has been on the 
islands of Java and Madura, even though the Chinese made only about 2 percent of the 
two islands’ population.21
Who are the Chinese Indonesians as defined by Poston, Mao and Yu? Their 
definition is based on Wang Gungwu’s studies on Chinese migration. Wang explained 
that the dominating type of Chinese migrants to Southeast Asian countries throughout 
history prior to 1850 is the Huashang (Chinese trader) pattern, characterized by male 
merchants and artisans who went abroad to set up businesses overseas.
 
22
                                                 
18 Dudley L Poston, Michael Xinxiang Mao, & Mei-Yu Yu, “The Global Distribution of the Overseas 
Chinese Around 1990,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1994): 635, 
 The latter 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2137606  
19  Ibid. 
20 Ng Shui Meng, “Indonesia,” in The Encyclopedia of Chinese Overseas, ed. Lynn Pan (Singapore: 
Chinese Heritage Centre, 1998) 151. 
21 G. William Skinner, “Creolized Chinese Societies Societies in Southeast Asia,” In the Sojourners 
and Settlers, ed. Anthony Reid (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1996), 99. 
22 (Poston, Mao and Yu 1994, 632) 
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types of migration include the Huagong (Chinese coolie) that predominated after 1850 
until the early 1920s, and the Huaqiao (Chinese sojourner) pattern that predominated 
after the fall of Imperial China in 1911, which often consisted of well-educated 
professionals who greatly contributed to the rise of Chinese nationalism overseas.23
The Malay Archipelago has been a site of Chinese migration for centuries, 
prior to Dutch colonization of the archipelago that began in the early 17th century. As 
mentioned above, early Chinese settlers were mostly involved in trade, and by the time 
the Europeans arrived in the archipelago in the 16th century there was a significant 
amount of Chinese settlements around port cities, and even some rural communities 
surrounding the cities. The Chinese often took the role of syahbandar, or master of the 
port who collected dues and taxes for the ruler. Some became close to local rulers and 
became a part of the local government, converted to Islam, and intermarried with local 
women.
  
24
Centuries of such interaction with Southeast Asian local environments gave 
birth to creolized Chinese societies, in which, according to G. William Skinner, “the 
cultural mix of Chinese and indigenous elements had stabilized into a ‘tradition’, 
including the use of indigenous-based Creole language influenced by Chinese 
grammar and lexicon.”
  
25
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
 This is certainly true to the Chinese in the archipelago 
particularly in Java, where the creolized Chinese communities became known as the 
Peranakan Chinese. This category is differentiated with the Totok Chinese 
community, referring to those who retain Chinese customs, traditions, languages, and 
affiliations with Mainland China. Totok Chinese include first-generation Chinese who 
migrated from the Mainland in the later period of Indonesian history or those who 
were born in the Dutch East Indies yet lived in an environment in which Chinese 
24 (Meng 1998, 152) 
25 (Skinner 1996, 52) 
16 
socio-culture was maintained. Language difference was certainly one of the defining 
distinctions between the two groups, which directly related to the different educational 
orientations each group had and, in the early 20th century, their different political 
orientations. In general, Peranakans are the majority of today’s Chinese population in 
Java, Bangka, West Kalimantan and West Sumatra, while Totoks dominate the rest of 
the Outer Islands of Java.26
As briefly described previously, the Chinese under pre-colonial native rule not 
only became a part of the multicultural society but also took a significant role in its 
government, indicating that ethnic tension was less of an issue at the time. 
Assimilation of culture and people was common not only among the Chinese but also 
among the Arabs, Indians, and other non-native settlers throughout the archipelago. In 
other words, pre-colonial Indonesian society cannot be defined as “a plural society” 
that characterized the later Dutch colonial period where colonial subjects were defined 
based on race or ethnicity. The latter would be the prevailing social system in the 
colonial Dutch East Indies, by which the Indonesian archipelago came to be known, 
until the Japanese invasion in 1942.         
  
 
Colonial Rule and Ethnic Chinese Economic Dominance 
It is very likely that the natives’ resentment against the Chinese had its roots in 
the Dutch colonial period. According to George Kahin, the establishment of the 
Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) or The Dutch East India Company’s 
power in the archipelago, particularly in Java, expanded the scope of the Chinese role 
in the region’s economic activity.27
                                                 
26 (Fryer and Jackson 1977, 260) 
 The Dutch East India Company was founded in 
1602 and ruled its Indonesian colonies until its bankruptcy in 1799, when the 
27 George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1952), 8. 
17 
administration of colonial territories was taken over by the Dutch government. The 
colonial territory would expand and reach its full extent in the early 20th century. 
The VOC’s primary objective was to maximize profit in the export-import 
trade.28 In the early years, the prized commodities were spices from the Moluccas, a 
small archipelago known as the Spice Islands in the West. Over time, the Company 
exploited local resources to produce the most sought after commodities in the 
European and global market including coffee, pepper and nutmeg. In order to do so, it 
was required for the Company to intervene in local politics in order to ensure 
agreements with local rulers that suited with its interests and to eliminate competitors 
consisting of Javanese, Arab, Chinese and non-Dutch European traders.29
Dutch colonial rule rearranged Indonesian social structure as a means to gain 
political and, ultimately, economic control. In the VOC period, social reconstruction 
was conducted primarily in Java, where the Company created a hierarchic political 
system with the Dutch at the top of the hierarchy. The next most powerful positions 
were dominated by selected native aristocrats (known in Java as the Priyayi, referring 
to the native class who worked as government bureaucrats) assigned to rule VOC-
controlled territories; in the later period, a few positions were granted to Chinese 
community leaders. But the expansion of Chinese economic power was made possible 
due to the Dutch’s favor to incorporate them as primary agents of the colonial 
economic system. The Company was only interested in the wholesale trade with 
China, leaving domestic retail trade to the Chinese in Java. The latter became 
“intermediaries” between the Company and the indigenous population
 
30 particularly as 
tax collectors for the Dutch.31
                                                 
28 (Fryer and Jackson 1977, 56) 
 Over time, from the seventeenth to the twentieth 
29 (Kahin 1952, 3) 
30  Ibid, 8 
31 Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 102. 
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century, the Dutch eventually allowed the Chinese to occupy the roles that they 
themselves could not fill.32
The economic importance of the Chinese, particularly in the urban setting, is 
reflected in the story of Batavia, which served as the Company’s headquarter, the 
center of Dutch colonial government starting from 1800 and, one and a half centuries 
later, became the capital of Indonesia. In 1619, Jan Pieterszoon Coen of the VOC 
decided to build a new harbor to rival the Sultanate of Banten and selected a native 
settlement named Jayakarta to the Sultanate’s east. The port city was named Batavia 
and became a major trading port for trade with China. Batavia itself was built 
primarily by Chinese laborers and its economic activities began primarily with 
Chinese retail commerce; soon the city became the site for the largest Chinese 
community in Java.
 
33
The VOC implemented a similar model to other territories that came under 
their rule; the Chinese were given the permission to monopolize various sectors such 
as collecting road tolls and charging bazaar fees. Given almost complete control of 
Java’s internal commerce in both urban and rural settings, the expansion of Chinese 
economic power practically marginalized the indigenous population. In urban areas, 
Chinese merchants’ economic power supported by colonial policies led to the 
disappearance of the once-flourishing pre-colonial Javanese merchant class.
 Chinese settlers became the city’s shopkeepers, merchants, and 
contractors of the city; some also lived as peasants outside the city’s walls and 
produced food stocks for the inner city’s population. Batavia was primarily a Chinese 
city as the Chinese consisted of one half of the total population. 
34
                                                 
32 G. William Skinner, “The Chinese Minority,” in Indonesia, ed. Ruth McVey (New Haven: Southeast 
Asian Studies, Yale University, 1963), 98. 
 
33 (Meng 1998, 152) 
34 (Kahin 1952, 3) 
19 
Another colonial policy had a major effect in the rural areas where landlords 
had to collect taxes or tolls from local peasants to pay to the government. Landlords 
made their profit by charging the peasants an amount above the government quota. 
The Chinese soon dominated this activity after the colonial administration as well as 
native landlords leased them the political and economic authority over a certain area 
consisting of villages or districts for an agreed period of time in a system known as 
“revenue farming”.35
The Chinese maintained their position when the colonies were taken over by 
the Dutch government. In the turn of the 19th century, a production boom of exported 
cash crops occurred not only in Java but also in Sumatra with the exportation of 
rubber, and in Celebes with the exportation of copra. Many Chinese entrepreneurs 
gained opportunity due to their long-term credit relationship with indebted peasants, 
enabling them to buy cash crops at monopolized-market price before selling them to 
the international market with much higher price.
  
36
This social inequality illustrates the dominating economic power of the 
Chinese over the native population during the colonial period. What should be noted is 
that the Chinese, as intermediaries between the natives and the Dutch, became the 
most visible economic oppressors in the eyes of the native majority. Indeed, the 
Chinese economic domination became one of the defining themes of The Chinese 
Problem in modern Indonesia. 
  
 
Colonial Rule and the Construction of Identity 
Aside from the Chinese and the Dutch, there were two other major groups of 
foreigners in the archipelago - namely the Arabs and the Indians. Under either the 
                                                 
35 (Meng 1998, 192) 
36 (Kahin 1952, 22) 
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VOC or surviving native rulers such as the Banten Sultanate and the Kingdom of 
Mataram, foreign population were always organized into groups led by their own 
headmen, who were responsible to collect taxes and manage the behavior of their 
community. These headmen were given the title Kapitan; thus the Arab, Indian, and 
Chinese communities all had their own respective Kapitan in almost every major city 
where they resided. What the native rulers did not do, however, was segregate the 
interaction between groups and categorize each of them under racial or ethnic terms, 
where each ethnic group had its own position under colonial law and hierarchic 
structure of society. This colonial policy left another major legacy to ethnic tensions in 
post-colonial Indonesia as the root of the construction of Pribumi versus non-Pribumi 
categories - a crucial dichotomy during the 20th century Indonesian New Order 
regime. 
The fact that economic privileges were granted to the Chinese in colonial 
period did not mean that the relationship between the Chinese and the Dutch rulers 
was always harmonious. It should be noted that those economic privileges, first of all, 
were not granted to the agriculture sector. In fact, in 1879, the colonial government 
issued a regulation that prohibited the Chinese to work as peasants.37
                                                 
37 Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Hoakkiau di Indonesia (Jakarta: Garba Budaya, 1998), 126. 
 Furthermore, 
there were times when Chinese settlers were targeted for oppression and even 
persecuted by both the Dutch and the natives. One of the most remembered and 
horrifying persecutions in Java was directed toward the Chinese in the 1740 Massacre 
in Batavia. It was triggered by a surplus of Chinese labors due to a previous VOC 
policy that created incentive for Chinese workers to migrate to Java in order to work 
mainly at cash crop plantations around Batavia. As economic circumstances caused 
massive unemployment, the Company decided to reallocate these labors to Ceylon. 
The Chinese coolies ran amok outside the city wall causing the Company to mobilize 
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its military power in order to kill the mobs. The Dutch also massacred an estimated 
10,000 Chinese residents within the city wall.38
After this incident, the Company decided to strengthen its control over its 
Chinese populations. It immediately regulated the ghettoization of Chinese 
neighborhoods, relocating many of them to an area that was purposefully located 
“within the range of the city’s guns” in case the Chinese attempted to revolt again, as 
mentioned in the VOC edict of March 5, 1741.
  
39 Furthermore, in order to ensure the 
separation of the Chinese from the rest of society, the VOC also issued aa resolution 
on December 11, 1759 that forbade the Chinese’s interaction with the indigenous 
community, particularly with the “Mohammedans.”40 This was problematic for many 
Peranakan Chinese who originally lived among indigenous communities, because the 
new law forced them to abandon their indigenous socio-cultural aspects of life and to 
adopt those of the Chinese as they were now considered as “full-blooded” Chinese.41
By the late 19th century, the colonial government had established similar 
policies to each group of colonial subjects. Laws such as the passenstelsel, or the 
“pass” system, regulated the movement of colonial subjects; those who attempted to 
travel beyond the boundaries of a certain jurisdiction had to have an authorized letter 
to do so.
  
42 In 1835, a policy similar to the Chinese ghettoization was imposed upon all 
colonial subjects and became known as The Quarter System, or wijkenstelsel, 
requiring each group to live in separate locations throughout the city.43
                                                 
38 Ibid, 124 
  
39 A.R.T. Kemasang, “The 1740 Massacre of Chinese in Java: Curtain Raiser for the Dutch Plantation 
Economy.” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 14 (1982): 70. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 (Toer 1998, 125) 
43 Ibid. 
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In her book about the Hadrami Arab community in the East Indies, Natalie 
Mobini-Kesheh took note of Benedict Anderson’s argument that colonial rulers in 
Southeast Asia “viewed their subjects’ populations through an ethnic-racial grid” in 
which colonial subjects “were increasingly viewed by their rulers in racial categories 
rather than, say, religious ones.”44 In fact, the Dutch colonial government divided its 
population into three major racial groups: Europeans, natives, and non-native “Foreign 
Orientals”, consisting of the Chinese, the Arabs, and the Indians.45
Similar to the case with the “native” category, yet excluded from future 
indigenous nationalist narrative, were those labeled as “Foreign Orientals”, who 
themselves were even more diverse in ethnic, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds; the 
Arabs were largely from Hadramaut in what is today Yemen
 Such categorization 
was constructed for practical administrative purposes without much discussion with 
those subjected to the labels. For instance, the term inlander, or “native to the islands,” 
under one “ethnic” category must have been controversial for those bearing the label 
because identifying a person from, say, Minangkabau in West Sumatra with a 
Buginese from the island of Sulawesi under one racial category was perhaps 
previously unheard of among the different peoples of the archipelago. Indeed, the 
Indonesian translation of the Dutch term inlander is Pribumi. This colonial policy 
certainly contributed to the binding of people from all around the archipelago under 
one group that would later become the foundation of Indonesian nationalism.  
46 while the Indians in 
North Sumatra and urban centers of Java were largely of Tamil, Punjabi, and Sindhi 
background.47
                                                 
44 Natalie Mobini-Khesheh, The Hadrami Awakening: Community and Identity in the Netherlands East 
Indies, 1900-1941 (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, 1999), 31. 
 As mentioned, the Chinese communities were already divided into two 
45 (Fryer and Jackson 1977, 21) 
46 Ibid. 
47 The Embassy, “Outline of Indonesia,” The Embassy of India in Jakarta, 
http://www.eoijkt.org/content.php?sid=186  
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major groups of the Peranakans and Totoks, yet there is still further diversity within 
the Totok category based on their demographic origin in Mainland China. Most 
Chinese immigrants in Indonesia came from the two provinces of Fujian and 
Guangdong, and the three major linguistic groups in Indonesian Chinese community 
were Hokkien, Hakka, and Cantonese, which were mutually unintelligible to each 
other.48
Sumit Mandral, as cited by Mobini Kesheh, argued that the 
“institutionalization of racial difference by the Dutch” in the environment was 
conducive to the emergence of a new consciousness:  
 This was even further complicated by the diversity within the Peranakan 
category, an umbrella term for Chinese who were assimilated to different native 
cultural and linguistic traditions across the archipelago.  
 
“… following the separation of groups by pseudo-racial categories through 
the pass and quarter system, more self-consciously Arab and Chinese groups 
had begun to assert themselves within the political legal boundaries that had 
been set up in the preceding half century… as some have argued in the case 
of the Chinese, in all likelihood this group would have been assimilated into 
native society had it not been for the statutory separations imposed on the in 
the second half of the nineteenth century.”49
 
  
The colonial East Indies’ social structure was vital to the construction of post-
colonial native (Pribumi) and non-native (non-Pribumi) categories. The creation of a 
plural society in the nineteenth and early twentieth century ended the interaction of 
different ethnic groups in the archipelago that had occurred for centuries. It was 
through colonial policy of segregation that the Pribumi and the Chinese developed 
separate identities, in such a way that the Chinese were the privileged group in the 
eyes of the colonial rulers and where Pribumi Indonesians belonged to the lowest 
social class - an important breeding ground for the construction of identities among 
                                                 
48 (Skinner 1963, 102) 
49 (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 32) 
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different groups, particularly in the dawn of nationalist ideas. In short, colonial social 
structure resulted in long-lasting consequences that still have a major impact to the 
Chinese Indonesians until the present day.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EMERGENCE OF CHINESE INDONESIAN NATIONALIST IDENTITY 
 
 According to Wang Gungwu, the Chinese traditionally never had a concept of 
identity, but rather a dichotomous concept of “Chineseness” that is measured 
according to being Chinese or being “un-Chinese”.50 Yet, he continued, ethnic 
Chinese in Southeast Asia “have changed and… are capable of undergoing further 
change.”51 This change refers to the way they have identified themselves in reaction to 
the introduction of new ideas, be it externally from the changing conditions in China 
or domestically within the regions where Overseas Chinese reside. The history of 
Peranakan and Totok Chinese societies in the Dutch East Indies discussed in Chapter 1 
demonstrates such a phenomenon. Wang Gungwu suggested that, prior to 1950, there 
were at least two ways the Chinese saw their “Chineseness”, which is equivalent to 
their sense of Chinese identity - one might be called historical identity, and the other 
Chinese national identity.52
 This chapter will discuss the rise of Chinese nationalist movements in the 
Dutch East Indies from 1900 to the early 1940s prior to the Japanese occupation. It 
attempts to explain how various forces - many of which were unrelated to the 
aspirations of the indigenous Indonesian nationalist movements yet existed side by 
side with native cause - dominated Chinese political activism since its inception in the 
early 20th century. Its purpose is to argue that the Mainland Chinese nationalist 
 The latter is a new development of 20th century Southeast 
Asian social order that has shaped the position of future Chinese Indonesians in post-
colonial society. 
                                                 
50 Gungwu Wang, “The Study of Chinese Identities in Southeast Asia,” in Changing Identities of the 
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movement and the concept of identity that they represented had a tremendous effect on 
the Dutch East Indies Chinese’s exclusion from the formation of Indonesian 
nationalist identity. 
 
Benedict Anderson on Indonesian Nationalism 
 In his celebrated book Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson defines the 
“nation” as “an imagined political community – and imagined both as inherently 
limited and sovereign.”53 He wrote, “It is imagined because the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even 
hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”54 He 
further wrote, “In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face 
contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, 
not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.”55
 In his other book Java in a Time of Revolution, Benedict Anderson began with 
a description of the crucial role of angkatan muda (younger generation) in the 
nationalist movements in Indonesia, from its formation in the beginning of the 20th 
century to the outbreak of revolution in 1945. The very idea of nationalism initially 
revolved among the youth of the indigenous elites who received Western education in 
the Netherlands or on the island of Java, the political, economic, and educational 
center of the colonial government. The early angkatan muda consisted mainly of the 
 
Anderson’s definition of the “nation” is central to understanding how indigenous 
Indonesians and the Chinese “imagined” their own versions of nationalism and to 
understanding the role of colonial policy in shaping those “imaginations.”  
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54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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children of Javanese aristocrats or the Priyayi class, successful entrepreneurs, or those 
with close relationship with colonial bureaucratic elites – a very privileged minority of 
the indigenous population. It was the experience of learning, according to Anderson, 
in institutions of higher education located in Batavia and Bandung that led these 
educated youths to formulate the ideology of Indonesian nationalism. He wrote that it 
was a result of “their experiences in schools where the raison d’etre derived directly 
from the centralized structure of the Netherlands Indies in the twentieth century… It 
was not until the Japanese period that nationalism spread deeply into small-town and 
rural Java; and it did so because of the new experiences encountered there, to which it 
gave coherent meaning.”56
 The epitome of Indonesian nationalism was then proclaimed by participants of 
the second Congress of Indonesian Youth from October 26 to 28, 1928, when, on the 
last day, they took the historic Pledge of the Youth or Sumpah Pemuda, committing to 
one nation, one people, and one language, namely that of Indonesians.
 
57
 Anderson further suggests that indigenous nationalism was partly a response to 
the monopoly of business by non-native ethnic groups. He wrote, “Almost everywhere 
economic power was either monopolized by the colonialists themselves, or unevenly 
shared with a politically impotent class of pariah (non native) businessmen - Lebanese, 
Indian and Arab in colonial Africa, Chinese, Indian and Arab in colonial Asia.”
 The three 
points were the essence of a cohesive Indonesian identity central to the understanding 
of the “us” and “them” in post-war Indonesia. 
58
                                                 
56 Benedict Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1972), 18-19. 
 An 
example of these phenomena is the development of what many considered to be 
Indonesia’s first popular nationalist organization, Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union) in 
57 Ibid, pp. 18 
58 Anderson 1991, 116 
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1912. Previously named Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trade Union), the 
organization was formed by entrepreneurs in what were traditionally considered native 
dominated industries, the batik industry and the kretek, or clove-cigarette, industry. 
They formed a union under one goal: to protect their industries from new competitors 
- namely the Chinese entrepreneurs.59 These new competitors appeared after the Dutch 
decided to monopolize the opium trade, which was dominated by urban-based Chinese 
traders and entrepreneurs.60
  
 To mobilize the increasing number of urban 
unemployment caused by the huge loss of this lucrative business, the government 
gradually removed travel restrictions for the Chinese in 1904 and, later on, in 1910, 
allowed them to infiltrate the interior rural market where native entrepreneurs 
prevailed. 
Chinese Nationalism: Peranakan vs. Totok 
 Indonesian nationalism was indigenous in character in the sense that it was 
proposed, formulated, and proclaimed by the young Pribumi elites in the Dutch East 
Indies. It is wrong, however, to assert that this particular nationalist outlook is 
exclusive only to the natives - although some may consider an exception, the inclusion 
of Indo-European journalist and politician Ernest Douwes Dekker61
                                                 
59 Kahin 1952, 67 
 as one of 
Indonesia’s national heroes, for instance, is symbolic to the acceptance of non-Pribumi 
individuals within the understanding of Indonesian national identity. Douwes 
Dekker’s case also reflects the essence of pre-independence Indonesian nationalism as 
a spirit of united resistance against colonial rule, regardless of ethnicity or religion, 
60 Vernon Joseph Turner, “A History of Indonesian-Chinese Relations in Indonesia since 
Independence: the Problems of Assimilation and Integration” (PhD diss., Cornell University, 1974), 24. 
61 Ernest Douwes Dekker (1879-1950) was one of the founders of Budi Utomo (Pure Endeavors) in 
1908. The birth of the organization, May 20th, 1908 is celebrated as The National Awakening Day. For 
more about Ernest Douwes Dekker see Van Der Veur, Paul. “E.F.E. Douwes Dekker: Evangelist for 
Indonesian Political Nationalism.” The Journal of Asian Studies, 17, 4 (1958): 551-566. 
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hence embodied in the national motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, which is roughly 
translated as “Unity in Diversity.” 
 However, this rhetoric was not extended to most Chinese in the East Indies at 
the time. From political perspective, this was mainly due to the various existing 
political streams among the Chinese themselves, many of which were oriented toward 
the nationalist cause in Mainland China. Popular mainly among Totok Chinese 
communities, this became known as “the Chinese movement in the Indies”62 but is 
referred to more accurately as the Totok pan-Chinese movement.63
 According to Donald Fryer and James Jackson, this movement was partly a 
response of the Chinese who became increasingly dissatisfied with their position under 
colonial rule in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, particularly to the restrictions on 
places of residence and movement of Chinese, unequal administration of justice, 
discriminatory taxes, as well as other measurements that the government took to limit 
Chinese domination in the economy.
  
64 In the political realm, the Chinese complained 
about their legal position in the Dutch East Indies, particularly after the colonial 
government granted the Japanese the same legal status as Europeans in 1899.65 What 
should also be highlighted, however, is the concern about the absence of well-
managed Chinese schools provided by the government,66 a particularly important body 
in order to preserve Chinese traditional identity. This awareness on the importance of 
Chinese identity was mainly triggered by Imperial China’s reclaim in 1896 that 
Chinese descendents all over the world were all her children.67
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66  (Fryer and Jackson 1977, 263) 
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 This agitation was then combined with the growing nationalist movement in 
Mainland China after the fall of Imperial China in 1911. It should be noted that, unlike 
the Peranakans, many Totok Chinese in the Dutch East Indies were not citizens of the 
colonial state, and therefore their interests in current Mainland Chinese politics were 
inevitable. Moreover, similar to the Indonesian nationalist movements, the role of 
education was important for the spread of the movement. In fact, Wang Gungwu 
explained that the Huaqiao pattern that predominated after 1911 was “strongly 
comprised of well educated professionals” and was “strongly tied to feelings of 
nationalism.”68 This was the turning point at which Wang’s historical identity 
experienced a transition into a national identity. Additionally, Sun Yat Sen’s concept 
of min-tsu (minzu), a translation of the Western concept of “race” or “nation”, reached 
Overseas Chinese’s social imaginings based on the idea that their ‘racial’ origins 
should lead them to identify with the nationalist cause in Mainland China.69
 The ties between education and Chinese nationalism were embodied within the 
establishment of Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (THHK), a pioneering Chinese organization 
that promoted education based on Confucian thought in Batavia in 1900. The aim of 
THHK was to educate Totok children as well as to resinify Peranakan Chinese.
 
70
 How did Peranakan Chinese respond to this Totok-dominated movement? The 
Dutch colonial government, who saw the latest nationalist trends among Totok 
Chinese residents as potential threat, had a major role in Peranakan’s response. In 
 The 
organization, quickly followed by others with similar intentions, built Chinese schools 
all over the archipelago. By 1911, THHK quickly became a supporter of the 
nationalist Kuomintang Movement that successfully overthrew the Qing Dynasty and 
established the Republic of China in the same year.  
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1908, the colonial government abandoned the policy of cultural exclusivism and set up 
Peranakan schools called the Hollandsch-Chineese Scholen (Dutch-Chinese Schools) 
that offered Western curriculum.71 Peranakan culture had also become increasingly 
Christianized due to the alternative of entering Catholic and Protestant schools, a 
phenomenon that Skinner interpreted as “a search for security and status in a rapidly 
changing society.”72 Skinner also mentioned, however, Peranakans who joined the 
Totok nationalist movement in hopes of purifying, or resinifying, Peranakan culture.73 
Nevertheless, the latter’s social, cultural, and political trends, particularly among the 
elites and the middle class, were generally oriented toward Dutch or Western 
culture.74 This development led to the formation of the Chung Hua Hui (CHH), an 
organization formed by Dutch-national Chinese in 1927 that advocated Dutch 
citizenship for Peranakan Chinese and specifically excluded the Totoks from its 
membership. They proposed to work in the interests of the Chinese community in the 
municipal and provincial councils and the Volksraad, a national advisory body of 
Dutch subjects in the Indies, while rejecting any dependence on the Chinese 
government.75
 Another development within the Chinese political arena in the Dutch East 
Indies was the formation of Partai Tionghoa Indonesia (PTI), or the Indonesian 
Chinese Party, in 1932. As reflected by its name, the organization supported 
Indonesian independence and took an anti-Dutch stance. There are at least two 
interpretations of the motivation behind PTI’s formation, however. As indicated by 
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Donald Willmott, the party was purely embracing Indonesian nationalist cause by 
provoking the Peranakan Chinese to “invest all their hopes in Indonesia” 76 and “forget 
about China”77 by working side by side with other ethnic groups for common ideals. 
Vernon Turner suggested a more pragmatic reason: the aim of this party “did not 
coincide with those of their Indonesian counterparts”78 because the Chinese 
emphasized “the preservation of their race as a culturally distinct ethnic group, and the 
eradication of those factors which conflicted with their interests.”79
 Thus, by the final period of Dutch rule in Indonesia, there were three political 
outlooks within the Chinese communities across the archipelago - namely Chinese-
oriented nationalism, Dutch-oriented political affiliation, and Indonesian nationalism. 
The PTI was the smallest of all in terms of membership and the least visible, 
specifically compared to the CHH and the THHK who had their own extensive 
network of political affiliations and newspaper publications.
 The two views 
may suggest polarization within the PTI itself, as its aspirations became a combination 
of the two.  
80 Yet, as suggested by 
Vernon Turner, it is probably true that most Chinese people did not have any interest 
in politics and therefore did not join nor sympathize with any of the three streams.81
 A series of Chinese political activism in the early to mid 20th century implied 
that at the time many Chinese viewed themselves to have a separate identity from that 
of the indigenous Indonesians, particularly because of their support for either the 
Mainland Chinese nationalist cause or for Dutch status quo over the Netherlands 
Indies. Nevertheless, the fact that the PTI represented some Chinese who did 
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sympathize and support the Indonesian nationalist cause was not recognized for a long 
time in the popular historical narrative of the Indonesian Revolution, at least prior to 
1998. Furthermore, the fact that there is no single Indonesian national hero who was of 
Chinese descent truly reflects this lack of recognition.  
 Mary Somers Heidhues argued that, after the Constitution and the Pancasila,82 
“the Revolution has probably been the most powerful symbol of national identity, 
whether in the Old Order under Sukarno or in the present (Suharto) regime.”83
 
 The 
Chinese was generally not considered as participants of the Revolution, leading 
indigenous Indonesians to question what Indonesian national identity meant to the 
Chinese. Over time, society has begun to consider the identity of ethnic Chinese to be 
outside the framework of Indonesian national identity, which has become the 
prevailing identity of the post-colonial era. As a product of a combination of political, 
economic, and cultural resentment, this perception has become the root of the troubled 
relationships between ethnic Chinese and the Indonesian state as well as society. This 
troubled and multifaceted schism is referred to as The Chinese Problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82 Pancasila is the national ideology of Indonesia. Formulated by Sukarno, it stated five principles that 
are meant to be a common ground for the different ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds of the 
Indonesian people. Or more on cultural analysis on Pancasila see Dharmaputera, Eka. “Pancasila and 
the Search for Identity and Modernity in Indonesian Society: a Cultural Analysis” in Boston College. 
Boston: Boston College, 1982. 
83 Mary F. Somers-Heidhues, “Citizenship and Identity: Ethnic Chinese and the Indonesian 
Revolution,” In Changing Identities of the Southeast Asian Chinese since World War II, ed. Jennifer 
Cushman and Wang Gungwu (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988), 115. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SUKARNO ERA: 1949 TO 1965 
 
 This chapter focuses on the dynamics of the Chinese-indigenous relationship 
during the Sukarno era - a period of political transition in which the politically 
dominant group was no longer the Dutch but the indigenous majority. There were at 
least three important issues in relation to the Chinese communities in this post-
independent political environment. First and foremost was the issue of citizenship that 
immediately affected the Chinese after independence. Second was the issue of Chinese 
economic dominance and the government’s subsequent attempts to develop 
indigenous economic dominance. Third was the issue of Chinese Indonesian political 
activism as a means of protecting their interests in the new, challenging environment. 
It should be noted that Chinese Indonesians refer to those who became or desired to 
become Indonesian citizens after independence.  
 The third issue, however, would be interrupted by another major political shift 
that linked them to the alleged communist threat in the later period of the Sukarno era. 
This shift led to a tragic end of the Sukarno era and the beginning of an oppressive and 
powerful military regime. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the early Chinese 
Indonesian social and political activism would leave a long-lasting legacy that would 
be rejuvenated again in the post-New Order era starting in 1998. 
 All three issues were complicated by the Indonesia’s foreign policy, 
particularly with its bilateral relationship with China. It is impossible to discuss many 
Chinese Indonesian issues in this period without discussing Indonesia’s relationship 
with China, particularly with regard to the issue of citizenship. Another troublesome 
bilateral issue was Indonesia’s nationalistic economic policy that discriminated 
“foreign citizens” who were predominantly Chinese citizens who resided in Indonesia 
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since the colonial period. As a result, Chinese Indonesian political activism during the 
Sukarno era was eventually affected by the souring relationship between the two 
countries.  
 
The Issue of Citizenship  
 The issue of citizenship was arguably the most important and complex matter 
for Chinese Indonesians. Within the Chinese communities, the issue instigated the 
Totok vs. Peranakan division to become a citizen vs. non-citizen division, in which the 
Peranakans tended to adopt Indonesian citizenship. Within the national context, this 
issue challenged the definition of Indonesian national identity and what it meant to 
those who acquired citizenship. But the most important aspect of this issue is that of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy, particularly with China.  
 It is important, first of all, to explain the relationship between the Indonesian 
government and the then Kuomintang Chinese government in the mid 1940s. There 
was no official diplomatic relationship between the two, but the concern about 
Chinese citizenship arose as early as 1946 when Indonesian nationalists adopted the 
Citizenship Act of 1946 (UU No. 3 Tahun 1946 tentang Penduduk dan Warga 
Negara).84 This act adopted the passive system of citizenship called jus soli, or “law 
of the soil,” meaning that the Chinese who were born in Indonesia and who had 
resided within the country (or occupied territories) continuously for five years 
automatically became Indonesian citizens, unless they legally abandoned the 
citizenship.85
                                                 
84 Wahyu Effendi and Prasetyadji, Tionghoa Dalam Cengkeraman SBKRI (Jakarta: Visi Media, 2008), 
18. 
 This was problematic because the Chinese government held the principle 
85 Willmott 1961, 26; Somers-Heidhues 1988, 120; Effendi and Prasetyadji 2008, 18. For more on the 
Citizenship Act of 1946 see Willmott 1961, 26. 
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of jus sanguinis or “law of the blood,” in which any person with Chinese ancestry 
anywhere in the world is considered to be a Chinese citizen.  
 The Chinese Communist Party took over the government from the Kuomintang 
and established the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949. On that same year 
Indonesia also gained its de jure recognition as an independent nation state at the 
Round Table Conference held in The Hague. Among other issues, the Indonesian and 
Dutch delegations discussed the matter of citizenship and its implementations. The 
conclusion implied that Chinese individuals, who were most likely Peranakans, were 
given a two-year period to reject their granted Indonesian citizenship if they wanted to 
be considered as Chinese citizens - thus, this was the second time Chinese Indonesians 
had to choose between two citizenships.86
 However, the agreement at the Round Table Conference was between 
Indonesia and the Netherlands, while the issue with China remained unsolved. At first 
the Communist Chinese government adopted the previous Kuomintang Republican 
government policy on Overseas Chinese. The issue resurfaced when China established 
diplomatic relationship with Indonesia in 1950. By 1954, however, China became 
increasingly active in seeking international support, and wanted Indonesia, its largest 
Southeast Asian neighbor, as an important ally. The Overseas Chinese status, 
therefore, threatened the well-being of Sino-Indonesian relations.
  
87 Thus, after a series 
of bilateral negotiations, the two governments finalized the Dual Nationality Treaty at 
the Asia-Africa Conference at Bandung in 1955.88
 The Dual Nationality Treaty stated that, starting January 20, 1960, Chinese 
Indonesians with dual nationality who were 18 years or older had to make a choice 
again between adopting either Chinese citizenship or Indonesian citizenship within the 
  
                                                 
86  (Willmott 1961, 27) 
87 (Fryer and Jackson 1977, 266) 
88 (Effendi and Prasetyadji 2008, 14) 
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next two years. Those who failed to do so would default to the nationality of their 
parents, which was most often Chinese.89 Nonetheless, there were several issues that 
complicated the implementation of these policies. One of these issues was that many 
local-born Chinese simply did not have certificates of permanent residency from the 
Dutch East Indies period. According to David Mozingo, about one-third of an 
estimated 2.5 million ethnic Chinese in Indonesia possessed dual nationality.90 He 
wrote, “Somewhat unexpectedly, only about 32,000 (out of a potential 700,000 to 
900,000 Chinese with dual nationality) have to date successfully opted for Indonesian 
nationality, while there is no evidence that even this many have chosen Chinese 
nationality.”91 This is particularly true among lower class Peranakan Chinese with 
little education. Thus, they officially became either Chinese citizens or, for those who 
were pro-Kuomintang, stateless.92
 
 
Economic Nationalism 
 Wang Gungwu argues that studies on ethnic Chinese identity in Southeast Asia 
in the period between 1950 and 1960 focused on three types of identity: national 
(local) identity, communal identity and cultural identity.93
 However, Wang does not mention the economic identity if the Chinese as one 
of the identities that received attention from this time period. The attention seemed to 
be focused more on the period of 1970s when scholars were particularly interested 
 These three aspects of 
identity resonate either directly or indirectly with the three important issues related to 
the Chinese in Indonesia. 
                                                 
89 David Mozingo, “The Sino-Indonesian Dual Nationality Treaty,” Asian Survey 10 (1963): 25.  
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 (Willmott 1961, 30) 
93 (Wang 1988, 1) 
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with Chinese ethnic and class identity.94
 During the Sukarno era, the primary concern of the Indonesian government 
with regard to the Chinese was to minimize Chinese dominance in the economic sector 
and to empower the position of the indigenous business class. The first major attempt 
to empower indigenous business class was the implementation of Benteng (Fortress) 
Program in 1950 by the Minister of Welfare, Djuanda. The program was to secure 
national control on import trade by reserving import licenses of several goods for 
indigenous importers.
 This could be because the regime that ruled in 
the 1970s focused on economic development, unlike Sukarno’s regime that focused 
more on political and nationalistic issues. It is important, however, to examine the 
Sukarno regime’s economic policies with regard to the ethnic Chinese because they 
reflect one of the most important aspects of The Chinese Problem in the coming years 
under Suharto.  
95 Sumitro, Indonesia’s Minister of Finance and Industry in 
1950, stated that the program was intended to counter the economic interests of the 
Dutch. Yet, the program was aimed to also counter the economic interests of Chinese 
businessmen who dominated the intermediate trade in rural areas and retail trade in 
urban areas.96 In practice, however, many indigenous businessmen used this privilege 
to join partnership with their Chinese counterparts in a relationship that became 
known as “Ali Baba”, in which an “Ali”, a nickname for a native Muslim, would use 
his name to reserve import licenses while leaving all the work to the “Baba,” which 
usually referred to Peranakan Chinese but, in this case, referred to any Chinese 
entrepreneur.97
                                                 
94 Ibid. 
 The Benteng Program was considered a failure and finally eliminated. 
95 Thee Kian Wie, “Indonesia’s First Affirmative Policy: The “Benteng” Program in the 1950s” (paper 
presented at the Workshop on the Economic Side of Decolonization, Yogyakarta, August 18-19, 2004). 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
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 Not long afterwards, the Chinese were again antagonized for their economic 
dominance. Asaat Datuk Mundo, a political figure of the Islamic party Masjumi and 
the chairman of the association of Pribumi Indonesian importers, delivered a speech at 
the Congress of the National Importers, in which he stated that there should be more 
preferential treatment given to indigenous Indonesians in economic affairs.98Asaat 
brought the Chinese economic issue to the national stage and started what has become 
known as the Asaat Movement, which called for the government to implement further 
affirmative action to empower Pribumi entrepreneurs and to combat ethnic Chinese 
domination. As Vernon Turner notes, this was one of the earliest public displays of 
anti-Chinese that “developed during the colonial period and were allowed to emerged 
as public and governmental issues following independence.”99
 In 1959 the Indonesian government launched another policy that aimed to 
protect indigenous economic interests. This time, the regulation was directed only 
toward non-citizen Chinese - particularly Chinese entrepreneurs who did not have 
Indonesian citizenship in rural areas. This policy was called Government Regulation 
Number 10 of 1959 (Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 10 Tahun 1959) that prohibited 
foreign citizens – in his case the Chinese – from being involved in retail activities 
within the county and bellow in areas outside of provincial capital.
 
100
                                                 
98 (Turner 1974, 104) 
 Those who had 
settled in these areas had to close down their business by January 1st, 1960. At the 
time, the term “foreign citizen” was targeted at ethnic Chinese who did not have 
Indonesian citizenship, as ninety percent of 86,690 registered foreign small retailers 
were ethnic Chinese. Furthermore, the Indonesian military was mobilized in order to 
implement this regulation, which was strongly enforced in several areas in West 
99  Ibid. 
100 “Peraturan yang Menggusur Tionghoa,” Tempo, August 13-19 2007, 94-95. 
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Java.101 A mass exodus of non-Indonesian Chinese from rural to urban areas followed, 
which eventually led the Chinese government to criticize the Indonesian government 
and arrange naval transportation to China for those who wanted to leave Indonesia.102
 
  
Baperki and Chinese Politics in Sukarno’s Indonesia 
 Despite all the discriminative policies that the Sukarno government imposed 
upon Chinese Indonesians, the Sukarno years also saw a rise of political activism 
particularly among Peranakan Chinese Indonesians. This was made possible largely by 
the period of liberal democracy that allowed the nation to hold its first-ever 
parliamentary election in 1955. This open political atmosphere ended in 1957 when 
Sukarno imposed martial law declaring his Guided Democracy and proclaimed 
himself president for life. 
 From the beginning of the Sukarno period, ethnic Chinese Indonesians were 
under very ambiguous and uncertain positions. In response, the Chinese focused on 
the protection of their interests by socio-political means. As early as 1948, Peranakan 
Chinese formed the Persatuan Tionghoa (Chinese Union) to defend their status, 
position, and culture. It was transformed to a political party, Partai Demokrat 
Tionghoa Indonesia (Chinese Indonesian Democratic Party), in 1950. Due to its lack 
of support, in 1954 a group of Western-educated Peranakans formed a new political 
organization called Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Indonesian 
Citizenship Consultative Body) or Baperki.103
                                                 
101 (Fryer and Jackson 1977, 269) 
 As emphasized by its leaders, Baperki 
did not see itself as a political party but rather as a mass organization with the purpose 
102 “Terusir dari Kampung Sendiri,” Tempo, August 13-19, 2007, 96-97. 
103  (Fryer & Jackson 1977, 269) 
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of gathering Chinese social and political interests under one umbrella organization. Its 
members could also join any political party in the nation.104
 Although not a political party, Baperki became involved in national politics by 
participating in the 1955 and 1957 elections, where it formed an alliance with the 
Indonesian Communist Party or the PKI in several areas, which gained a substantial 
amount of support from Chinese Indonesians. Baperki won one chair in the parliament 
and elected its charismatic spokesman, Siauw Giok Tjhan, as its representative.
 
105 
Siauw Giok Tjhan was also a cabinet minister in the Amir Syarifuddin Government.106
 Although initially focused on parliamentary elections, in the late 1950s 
Baperki became more concerned with community service. It specially assisted Chinese 
communities in establishing schools with Indonesian curricula as a response to the ban 
of Chinese–language schools by the government in 1957.
  
107 More importantly, 
Baperki was engaged in a prominent discussion of assimilation and integration; the 
two proposed policy solutions to the question of how ethnic Chinese fit in to the 
concept of Indonesian nationhood. The integrationists saw the Chinese as simply one 
of the hundreds of ethnic groups of Indonesia who had the right to retain their distinct 
identity.108 Baperki argued that one of the bases for this logic was related to the 
national motto Bhineka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity), which could easily be 
interpreted as allowing the Chinese to exist as a distinct ethnic group.109
                                                 
104 Charles A. Coppel, Indonesian Chinese in Crisis, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1983), 43. 
 Furthermore, 
although the Constitution mentioned the difference between suku bangsa Indonesia 
(referring to the indigenous ethnic groups of Indonesia) and suku bangsa asing 
105 (Turner 1974, 124) 
106 Ibid. 
107 (Fryer and Jackson 1977, 270) 
108 Adam Schwartz,  A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability (Boulder: Westview Press, 
A Member of the Perseus Books Group, 2000), 104.; (Coppel 1983, 44) 
109 (Turner 1974, 63) 
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(foreign ethnic groups), it did not mention the need for assimilation to the point that 
these ethnic groups’ characteristics are eliminated.110
 On the other side of the debate were the assimilationists, represented by 
Lembaga Pembina Kesatuan Bangsa (LPKB), or the Institute of Promoters of 
Indonesian Nationhood. The assimilation movement appeared in 1960 as a response to 
the controversial Government Regulation Number 10 of 1959 and the implementation 
of the Dual Nationality Treaty.
 
111 Assimilationists believed that there was no future 
for the Chinese to continue demanding special consideration from the government as a 
distinct ethnic group, because discrimination from society and the government would 
always exist. Instead, according to Thung Lian Lee, who was one of the leading 
assimilationists, only a complete assimilation of the Chinese into the general 
population would lead to a harmonious society.112 He asserted that this should be 
viewed as a realistic solution as oppose to the idealistic ethnocentrism of the 
integration approach.113
 
 Advocates of assimilative approach to Indonesian nationhood 
formed the LPKB in 1963 after a conference that condemned the establishment of 
Baperki’s exclusively Chinese schools. 
Communism and Chinese Indonesians 
 Aside from their ideological stance, it is important to take note of the two 
major Chinese organizations’ political affiliation with the actors in Indonesian politics 
at the time. The LPKB, which was typically anti-communist in its political affiliations, 
was closely associated with the Indonesian army, which was one of the major groups 
in the national political scene. To some extent, the organization was also sponsored by 
                                                 
110 Ibid, 62-63 
111 (Coppel 1983, 45) 
112 (Coppel 1983, 45); (Schwarz, 2000, 104) 
113 (Turner 1974, 63) 
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the army, and its membership also included typically rightist Pribumi civilian 
members. Furthermore, its Jakarta headquarter was also located on army property.114
 Baperki, on the other hand, was affiliated with the Indonesian Communist 
Party or the PKI – an affiliation that would be troublesome in the future. Although 
never claiming himself a communist, Siauw Giok Tjhan made statements indicating 
communist ideals and was close to prominent PKI members.
  
115 This was problematic 
for some Baperki members because they saw this affiliation as a move away from the 
organization’s non-alignment stance with regard to political parties.116
It was also this affiliation that brought Baperki to its end. The PKI and the 
Indonesian Army were two opposing factions competing for political power, and as 
the party that won the largest majority, the PKI became particularly close to President 
Sukarno during the Guided Democracy era. This alarmed the army not only 
ideologically but also politically, because the PKI had very close relations with the 
Communist Chinese government. Donald Fryer and James Jackson wrote, “In the eyes 
of Peking it was not the Overseas Chinese who offered the best prospect of 
revolutionary success in Indonesia, but the PKI, and this was overwhelmingly 
Indonesian in membership.”
 
117
The power struggle between the army and PKI escalated in 1965 when the 
president’s poor health raised the question of political succession in case of his death. 
Another alarming development for the army was Sukarno’s proposal to create a Fifth 
Force to support Indonesia’s confrontation with the neighboring country of 
 
                                                 
114 (Coppel 1983, 45) 
115 (Turner 1974, 124) 
116 Ibid, 125 
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Malaysia.118 The Fifth Force was to consist of farmers and peasants who were given 
military training and arms, and to be an entirely independent entity from the 
Indonesian military. The implication of the Fifth Force was worrisome due to the 
PKI’s popularity among peasants and farmers, since it could serve as the party’s 
armed forces in order to take over the country. Finally, the army became alarmed 
when a pro-Sukarno air force officer, Field Marshall Omar Dhani, went to China to 
discuss the purchase of small arms for the Fifth Force.119 Sukarno himself appeared to 
be increasingly more comfortable with the PKI as his major political ally. Tension 
escalated among Indonesia’s political elites, as there were widespread rumors about a 
possible coup on October 5th, 1965 allegedly by a group of high-ranking army officers 
called the Council of Generals. That day, elite battalions of the Indonesian Armed 
Forces from across the country gathered in Jakarta to join a parade to celebrate its 
birthday.120
On the night of September 30th (or more precisely the early morning of 
October 1st), six top army generals and a junior officer were kidnapped and killed by a 
group led by Colonel Untung who called themselves The September 30th Movement” 
(Gerakan September Tigapuluh or Gestapu), claiming that their conduct was a counter 
attack against the coup attempt by the members of Councils of Generals.
  
121
                                                 
118 The Fifth Force refers to the creation of a new military unit after the army, the navy, the air force, 
and the police. For more about Indonesia’s Confrontation with Malaysia see Sutter, John O. “Two 
Faces of Konfrontasi: “Crush Malaysia” and the Gestapu.” Asian Survey 6, 10 (1966): 523-546. 
 Three days 
later, on October 4th, Indonesians heard a contradicting statement on national radio 
from a relatively unknown general named Suharto, claiming that the September 30th 
Movement itself was a coup attempt to overthrow the government, and that the 
119 Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy (Singapore: Graham Brash (PTE) Ltd., 1978), 94. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
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mastermind behind this coup attempt was the Indonesian Communist Party.122 It was 
the beginning of what the CIA called “one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth 
century”123 when in the next six months Indonesians were engaged in a bloodbath that 
may have taken more than half a million lives. The army helped either to execute or 
accommodate gangs of Muslim, Christian, Hindu, and other anti-communist elements 
to hunt down and kill anyone suspected of affiliation with the PKI.124
 
 Six months 
later, on March 11, 1966, President Sukarno resigned after transferring his presidential 
power to Suharto, the man whom few Indonesians knew before the September 30th 
Movement. 
The New Order Regime and ethnic Chinese politics 
 Most victims of the communist purge were indigenous Indonesians, and the 
anti-communist purge could not be equated with anti-Chinese violence.125
                                                 
122 Ibid, pp. 103. For more about the accusation against PKI see (May 1974, 103-120). The exact 
chronology, real perpetrators, and, more importantly, the purpose behind this event remains a 
controversy due to contradicting evidence and information. Scholars have different opinions on the 
subjects. Cornell University scholars Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey argued that it was Suharto 
who was behind the coup, and that the PKI, with its strategic position in the Indonesian political scene, 
would not have the incentive to conduct a coup to overthrow Sukarno. For more about this argument 
see Anderson, Benedict R. O’G and Ruth T. McVey. A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, 
Coup in Indonesia. Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1971. Berkeley scholar and 
former Canadian diplomat Peter Dale Scott emphasized the role of the CIA in the overthrow of 
Sukarno. For more about this argument see Dale-Scott, Peter. “The United States and the Overthrow of 
Sukarno, 1965-1967.” Pacific Affairs 58, 2 (1985): 239-264. But many others, particularly Indonesian 
scholars, are convinced that the PKI was behind the coup, in line with the official version of the coup. 
For more about this view see Subroto, Hendro. The revolutionary council of the Indonesian Communist 
Party (PKI): report on its failure to turn Indonesia into a Communist country. Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar 
Harapan, 2008. 
 However, 
the PKI’s affiliation with China brought the attention of Suharto’s new regime to the 
ethnic Chinese. Suharto’s New Order (Orde Baru) regime chose the name to 
123 Peter Dale-Scott, “The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967.” Pacific Affairs 58, 
2 (1985): 240. 
124 Ibid, 243 
125 For more analysis on why the anti-communist purge did not turn into an anti-Chinese violence see 
(Coppel 1983, 59) 
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differentiate itself from Sukarno’s regime, which was now referred to as the Old Order 
(Orde Lama). Suharto established a military authoritarian regime that was staunchly 
anti-communist and, therefore, anti-Communist China, which the government accused 
of being the financiers for the PKI.126
 This development clearly sealed the fate of Baperki. Its affiliation with the PKI 
put it in the worst possible position as an organization, and not long afterwards the 
government banned and dissolved the organization by closing down its schools and 
regional offices.
 The regime declared that communism was a 
national threat and decided to “freeze” its diplomatic relationship China. With regard 
to the ethnic Chinese, Suharto’s regime accused them for having the potential of being 
a fifth column for the PRC, an allegation that indiscriminately accused all Chinese, 
citizens and non-citizens alike, as dangerous and disloyal. 
127 On the other hand, the LPKB campaigned to ban Baperki in a 
vigorous attempt to salvage the tarnished image of ethnic Chinese as opportunists and 
communist sympathizers, loyal only to China or their community. Eventually, the 
LPKB and its assimilationist policy were incorporated into the New Order government 
in attempt to solve The Chinese Problem.128
 Thus, understanding the development of the Chinese-Pribumi relationship 
during the Sukarno era is crucial in analyzing the position of the Chinese in 
Indonesian society during the New Order regime. The Sukarno government’s 
affirmative action policies to weaken the economic power of the Chinese reflected the 
strain between the Chinese minority and the non-Chinese majority. As a response, the 
Chinese social and political activism during this era was their own attempt to solve the 
strain between them and the majority. The hostility of the majority toward this ethnic 
minority would take a new form when the “Chinese Problem” became an official issue 
 
                                                 
126 (Coppel 1983, 56) 
127 For more about the dissolution of Baperki see (Coppel 1983, 56-57) 
128 (Coppel 1983, 63) 
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of the state, in which the new regime under President Suharto produced a series of 
regulations designed to solve this “problem.” However, these policies deeply affected 
the everyday lives of ethnic Chinese in Indonesian society and eventually brought a 
devastating effect.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE SUHARTO ERA: 1966 – 1998 
 
This chapter discusses the Chinese-indigenous relationship during the Suharto 
era. Two main issues conditioned the lives of Chinese Indonesians under the New 
Order regime. First was the Indonesian government’s accusation of Chinese 
Indonesians for being potential agents of communist China; in turn, the government 
forced the Chinese to abandon their cultural affiliations with China and assimilate into 
the majority population by adopting indigenous Indonesian culture and other attributes 
of identity. As will be discussed in this chapter, this policy was implemented in the 
form of discriminative regulations on various aspects of Chinese Indonesian life.   
 The second issue was related to the Indonesian society’s perception toward this 
ethnic minority. Suharto’s New Order regime incorporated entrepreneurs who were 
mainly ethnic Chinese to implement its economic development policy. This 
involvement gave the opportunity for these businessmen to gain enormous wealth 
through various government concessions as well as from a form of patronage 
relationships with top-level officials from the government and the military. This 
relationship was corrupt and, in turn, had a detrimental effect on the image of ethnic 
Chinese as an identity in Indonesian society. The popular image of Chinese 
Indonesians as a group became associated with economic exploitation through corrupt 
relationships with the regime.  
 These accusations heavily affected the lives of Chinese Indonesians during the 
New Order era, as anti-Chinese expressions of various degrees occurred in different 
places across the nation. The climax of such expression occurred from the 13th to the 
15th of May, 1998, only days before Suharto resigned from presidency.  
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Suharto’s Indonesia 
  For the New Order regime, political stability and economic development were 
two primary goals that went hand-in-hand. Political stability was achieved primarily 
through the doctrine of Dual Function (Dwifungsi), in which the role of Indonesian 
military members was not only to be the nation’s primary defense apparatus but also 
to be active participants in national politics.129 Members of the military were able to 
occupy powerful legislative and executive positions while serving as military officers. 
In accommodating the Dual Function practice, which blurred the line between military 
and civilian rule, one of the government’s major strategies was to heavily control 
national parliamentary elections and to allow only three parties to run. The ruling 
party was Suharto’s own named Functional Groups (Golongan Karya) or Golkar. It 
was a party dominated by the three major currents in post-Sukarno politics, namely the 
anti-communist civilian groups, the government bureaucrats, and the army, whose 
members often became the party’s most senior members.130
 Political stability was also achieved by the centralization of power, in which all 
political and economic aspects, including the allocation of budget, the appointment of 
governor and head of regency, the structure of local government, the development 
plan, and even the shape of governmental buildings and offices, must be under the 
control of the central government in Jakarta.
 Over three decades 
Golkar managed to win the majority in virtually every election of the New Order era.  
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regime also imposed strict media control of popular opinion toward the 
government.132
 However, it was a dictatorship with pragmatic means, as was primarily 
reflected in the government’s policy on economic development. “Development” 
became the ultimate buzzword of the Suharto era to the extent that the president 
promoted himself as The Father of Development (Bapak Pembangunan). It did make 
sense, however, for Suharto to have development of all sectors in the economy on as a 
high priority as he took the office as Indonesia’s second president in 1968. When 
Sukarno left office in 1966, Indonesia’s economy was in devastation with negative 
growth rate, six hundred percent inflation, virtually zero foreign reserve, and a 
national debt of US$ 2 billion.
 Furthermore, its transmigration plan enabled the government to 
manage the nation’s population to suit its political and economic interests. In short, the 
New Order regime created a military authoritarian state with Suharto as its chief 
dictator. 
133 As soon as Suharto took power, he ensured that the 
economy was a primary concern. His American-educated team of economists 
restructured the nation to be a part of the free market economic system, encouraging 
foreign investments and trade with Western countries.134 The regime also welcomed 
financial support from donor countries as well as from international financial 
organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF, the IGGI, and the ADB for economic 
stabilization.135
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activities, especially to create the much sought employment opportunities for the 
millions of unemployed Indonesians. To do so, the New Order government relied 
particularly on the Chinese business community, a group within society that held the 
most significant amount of capital.136
 The bond between economic development and political stability cannot be 
overemphasized in securing the regime’s strategic position and, in turn, Suharto’s 
power. A stable economic development was the key for political stability, as indicated 
by R. William Liddle who wrote, “In the eyes of many Indonesians, economic growth 
also validates Suharto's vision of a strong state that successfully pursues development 
while remaining paternalistic and insulated.”
  
137
 However, the regime’s obsession to generate economic growth also spawned a 
massive socio-economic inequality in Indonesian society. Corruption, a practice that 
became universal in virtually all levels of Indonesian society, was in the heart of this 
inequality. Corruption on its largest scale involved the exploitation of the nation’s vast 
natural resources such as petroleum, minerals, timbers, gas, and forests. Generally, the 
exploitation of these primary commodities was intended to provide the capital for 
development, yet government officials managed to use their political control over 
these mechanisms as an instrument for personal wealth and, equally important, to 
nurture crucial patronage relationships to maintain their power. This was done so by 
allocating the rights of resource exploitation to selected individuals.
 In other words, the Indonesian people 
had their political freedom curtailed in exchange for economic security. This was an 
essential characteristic of Indonesian society under the New Order regime.  
138
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such practices were done to ensure loyalty among his key allies, especially members 
of the military elites.139
 This patron-client relationship became the norm of the regime’s bureaucratic 
culture from the top echelons down to field bureaucrats, a culture that toward the end 
of the regime became known as the KKN, which stands for corruption (korupsi), 
collusion (kolusi), and nepotism (nepotisme).
  
140
 
 Virtually anyone who must deal with 
government bureaucracy is familiar with certain corrupt expectations they must fulfill 
in order to get what they need. 
The Chinese Problem 
 The phrase The Chinese Problem was incorporated into the New Order regime 
by a series of legislations. These legislations were adopted during the early years of 
the Suharto era when extreme anti-Chinese sentiments were prevalent within the 
government as well as among non-Chinese Indonesians. Indonesia’s bilateral relation 
with China, first of all, turned sour when it suspended trade with the Communist 
government in September of 1966. One month later Indonesia unilaterally suspended 
its diplomatic relations with China indefinitely. This was clearly a turning point in 
Indonesia’s international political and economic policies. Whereas the Sukarno era 
government was staunchly anti-West, Indonesia under Suharto welcomed Western 
support, particularly in economy and trade. In terms of trade relations, Indonesia also 
became closer to Taiwan as it moved away from China.  
 Domestic anti-Chinese sentiments were particularly frequent in this early 
period. Student demonstrators and Muslim youth groups, who demanded the 
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resignation of Sukarno in 1966, had turned their attention to the Chinese - this trend 
was worsened by the mobs of urban poor who saw the opportunity to loot Chinese 
properties. In several cities in Java and Sumatra, mobs targeted Chinese stores and 
houses, and there were reports about Chinese community leaders and teachers having 
been tortured or killed.141 The Chinese were virtually driven out of provinces such as 
Aceh, parts of North Sumatra, and West Kalimantan. Furthermore, student 
demonstrators took over Chinese-language schools that would eventually be turned 
into government property.142
 It was during this tense social setting that the Suharto government released a 
document entitled “The Basic Policy for the Solution of the Chinese Problem” (Surat 
Edaran Presidium Kabinet Ampera No: SE-O6/Pres.Kab/6/1967 Tentang Masalah 
Cina) that regulates the term “Tionghoa” to be changed in use with the word 
“Cina.”
 
143 It reads,  “From the perspective of ethnological-politics and historical 
etymology, the terms “Tionghoa/Tiongkok” carry negative political association for the 
Indonesian people, while the term “Cina” only represents a name (of a place) where 
the Chinese race came from, and for most of us the two terms are not detached from 
(various) psychological and emotional aspects.”144
 This “negative political association” refers to the fact that the word “Tionghoa” 
during the Sukarno era was closely affiliated with the PRC, or “Republik Rakyat 
Tionghoa.” What the document referred to as “psychological and emotional aspects” 
of the term in its second verse is its inherently political connotation, particularly when 
used in Sukarno’s orations on strengthening the close relationship between the two 
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nations. Changing the term to a more apolitical “Cina” is, therefore, viewed as the first 
step to disapprove communist ties from Chinese Indonesians. But the problem with 
such change is that the term “Cina” itself has been inherently derogatory in Indonesian 
vernacular. This was the reason why the Chinese preferred the word “Tionghoa” in the 
first place, which is the Hokkienese pronunciation of the Mandarin word “Zhongguo,” 
the official term to which Chinese citizens refer their nation. This shift constituted for 
more prejudice against the Chinese communities in the nation. 
 Nevertheless, the government continued to impose policies developed to 
assimilate Chinese Indonesians into Indonesian nationhood based on its own 
subjectivity. This was the responsibility of the National Intelligence Coordination 
Body (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara) or BAKIN, the New Order’s national 
intelligence agency, which created a separate division for this matter called Chinese 
Problem Coordination Body (Badan Koordinasi Masalah Cina). In 1979 this division 
published a three-volume handbook entitled A Guide for the Solution of the Chinese 
Problem.145 Written only for a limited audience within the government,146 it vividly 
describes the government’s solution to the problem, from ideological conception to 
technical implementation to the plan of action, “in order to simplify the task of 
Officials and Operators in everyday usage.”147
 The anonymous author(s) wrote that, based on the National Constitution 
(Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 or UUD 1945), the Parliament (MPRS) reinforced 
Resolution Number III/MPRS/1966 about the Promotion of National Unity 
(Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa) “in order to solve the social conflict that arose as a 
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consequence of Gestapu/PKI in 1965.” 148 The resolution suggests three basic 
principles - one of them states that there should be an “acceleration of integration 
process through the assimilation of citizens of foreign descent.”149 This was the 
foundational thinking (pikiran dasar) for the next step of foundational policies 
(kebijaksanaan dasar). The earliest series of policy was the Presidential Instruction 
(Instruksi Presidium) No. 37/U/IN/6/1967 outlining the main policies concerning the 
solution to The Chinese problem,150
(a) Foreigners in Indonesia could stay and work in the country only with  
 particularly regarding those who were Chinese 
nationals, that regulate the following: 
permission by the government, and the Indonesian government claimed that their 
investment in Indonesia was essentially a national investment. This instruction was 
to be converted into an act - UU No. 6 of 1968 about domestic investment - which 
was also intended to “prevent the transfer of those investments abroad.”151
(b) Establishment of foreign schools was only permitted for the needs of diplomatic  
 
and consulate family members as well as other foreigners who only resided 
temporarily in Indonesia, referring to expatriates. 
(c) Foreign nationals, either temporary or permanent residents, were allowed to  
establish organizations that were “local” but only served in several sectors 
including health, religious affairs, death, sports and recreation. 
(d) Diplomatic relationship with the PRC would be regulated according to Indonesian  
national interest. 
 It is clear that these particular instructions were directed toward non-
Indonesian-citizen Chinese, including those who had been residing on the archipelago 
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since the Dutch period. For Chinese Indonesians there was a different set of 
regulations through the Presidential Instruction No. 240 of 1967 that emphasized the 
necessity of consultation (pembinaan) to assimilate them into Indonesian society. It 
stated, “The consultation of Indonesian nationals of foreign descent (WNI keturunan 
asing) will be conducted through the process of assimilation, mainly to prevent a 
racially exclusive life. For this assimilation process there is an opportunity for 
Indonesian nationals of foreign descent to channel their ability and financial capability 
(daya dan dananya) in all fields to accelerate development and enhance prosperity and 
welfare of the Nation and the State.” 152
 From the statements above, it is possible to conclude at least three points. First, 
at least from the government’s perspective, The Chinese Problem was directly linked 
to the Communist threat. Secondly, the means to solve The Chinese Problem was 
through assimilation of the Chinese into Indonesian society. Lastly, the Chinese were 
expected to financially participate in the development program of the nation. These 
were the major components of the official understanding of The Chinese Problem and 
its solution.  
 
 Together, these components were indeed problematic for the following 
reasons. First, the communist threat accusation was a political threat, while 
assimilation as its solution could generate changes in the socio-cultural spheres. 
Although the latter may have an impact on one’s political orientation, it should be 
remembered that communism has its own version of socio-cultural ideology that was 
implemented in opposition to traditional “Chinese” or “Russian” socio-cultural 
practices. In short, equaling Chinese socio-cultural practices with communist political 
ideology was a product of insensitivity by the Indonesian government.  
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 Second, the link between an assimilation process and the requirement to 
channel financial support, as mentioned in the Presidential Instruction No. 240 of 
1967, could be interpreted as an official confirmation of the popular Indonesian 
perception towards the Chinese, that the economic affluence of some was inherently 
Chinese. And third, although the approach of assimilation was propagated by the 
Chinese organization LPKB, it is unclear whether these assimilative regulations were 
the result of a discussion with Chinese organizations like LPKB, because these 
organizations would have more likely rejected the discriminative characters of these 
coercive measures. For instance, the Parliamentary Resolution (Ketetapan MPRS) No. 
XXXII/1966 about the regulation of the press includes the following: “Press 
publication in foreign language not written in Latin alphabets (for instance Chinese) is 
allowed only for one publisher chosen by the state.”153 Moreover, the Cabinet 
Presidium Decision (Keputusan Presidium Kabinet) No. 127/U/Kep/12/1966 regulated 
the need for Indonesians of foreign descent to change their foreign names to more 
familiar (lazim) sounding Indonesian names “in order to facilitate better social 
communication.”154 One of the most controversial legislation, however, was the 
Presidential Instruction No.14/1967 that regulated Chinese religion, belief, and 
customs and traditions, limiting Chinese religious practices to private settings, and 
banning Chinese religious and traditional celebrations in public.155
 Another major problem arose in April 1969, when Indonesia unilaterally 
declared that the Dual Nationality Treaty was invalid. This ended the right of minors 
to hold two nationalities until they reached 18 years of age, making children of 
Chinese descent immediately hold the citizenship of their parents. Naturalization was 
not impossible, but, as reported by Munthe-Kaas, “The Indonesian authorities have so 
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far shown no urge to speed up or facilitate the process of naturalization for either 
Chinese nationals or the stateless Chinese in spite of their professed commitment to 
this goal.”156
 As reflected by the legislations above, assimilation became the basis of many 
coercive government policies. There were various reactions among the Chinese 
communities toward these new regulatory policies. Although many decided to flee 
from Indonesia, many who either chose to stay or had no other choice began to adopt 
the assimilation program (program pembauran), or at least appear to move toward 
assimilation, in order to adjust to the new situation. Yet, at heart many saw “no reason 
why they should have to jettison their culture to prove that they are worthy and loyal 
Indonesian citizens.”
  
157
 But perhaps the government’s most troubling policy was the obligation for 
citizens to prove their status of citizenship by introducing a new legal document 
entitled the Letter for Proof of Citizenship of the Republic of Indonesia (Surat Bukti 
Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia) or SBKRI which was a certificate of evidence 
regarding Indonesian citizenship. Article 1 of the Minister of Justice Decree No. JB 
3/4/12 of 1978 regarding SBKRI stated, “each citizen of Indonesia must prove his 
citizenship by applying for a copy of SBKRI to the Ministry of Justice.”
 
158
In practice, however, this document was compulsory only for Chinese 
Indonesians, as they were required to present it when applying marriage certificate, 
 
Technically, every citizen had to have this document in order to apply for the 
Residency Identity Card or KTP, an obligatory identity card for those who have 
reached the age of seventeen.  
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birth certificate, and other documents issued by the government. Not surprisingly, this 
process created an incentive for corruption among field-level bureaucrats. For 
instance, although Article 2 sub-paragraph 2 of the Joint Decree stated that there was 
no administration fee to issue SBKRI, one of Indonesia’s biggest newspapers reported 
that the fee to issue this certificate reportedly ranged from 1 million to 7 million rupiah 
(around $100 to $700) and took around two to three weeks to produce.159
The introduction of SBKRI is a major example of the structural vulnerability 
for ethnic Chinese legal rights in Indonesian society. With such a weak legal basis 
there was no firm guarantee by the state to provide protection for them.  Protection 
became, as Jemma Purdey put it, “a day-to-day concern.”
  
160
 
  
The Economy and the Chinese 
 In his book about Chinese business in Indonesia, Christian Chua noted that 
popular perception of ethnic Chinese Indonesians during the New Order era was 
problematic because it was based on a number of Chinese business tycoons associated 
with the corrupt government. He wrote, “The powerful position of the Chinese 
billionaires is without question: what is problematic was that the remaining 6 million 
Sino-Indonesians were considered to be as powerful, wealthy, and exploitative.”161
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Indeed, as the Chinese business community became crucially involved in the nation’s 
economic development, resentment against their economic domination became even 
stronger among indigenous Indonesians. With the political impotence of the Chinese, 
there was no source for the majority to learn about the diversity within the ethnic 
Chinese communities. In turn, many non-Chinese Indonesians had the tendency to 
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associate any Chinese, wealthy and poor alike, citizens and non-citizen alike, 
Peranakan and Totok alike, and entrepreneur and non-entrepreneur alike, with 
economic exploitation, corrupt relationship with the bureaucratic system, and, most 
importantly, wealthy. 
 From 1966 to the early 1990s, Indonesia had an average growth rate of 
between five to ten percent each year, which indicated an economic expansion by 
almost five hundred percent within those decades.162 The oil boom in the early 1970s 
led to spectacular growth particularly in petroleum exports, as well as in 
manufacturing, mining sectors, and other natural resources.163 By the late 1980s 
Indonesia was hailed as one of Asia’s success stories on the way to becoming a newly 
industrialized economic entity. The percentage of people living under the poverty line 
declined from well over half of the population to around 20 percent.164 The New Order 
government achieved international recognition for its successful food production as 
the country became self sufficient in the production of rice, and its successful family 
planning programs made Indonesia a model country for its implementation.165
 As mentioned previously, however, widespread socio-economic inequality was 
clearly visible throughout the nation. Population living standards remained very low, 
while wealth was and remains highly concentrated in a few urban areas, particularly in 
Jakarta. Suharto’s family and his close friends were among those who particularly 
gained spectacular wealth. The President and his wife were involved in private 
business activities, and their children were infamously involved in their own business 
interests in telecommunications, shipbuilding, agribusiness, and the nation’s basic 
infrastructures, among many others. The wealth of the presidential family became one 
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of the most prominent issues particularly among Indonesian urban populations within 
the last decade of the New Order era, when the President’s children began to enter the 
country’s business realm.166
 Public sentiments on economic inequalities were also focused on the Chinese 
big business tycoons who also managed to gather enormous wealth. Some of these 
entrepreneurs were among Suharto’s closest cronies who occupied a central position in 
maintaining the interrelationship between economic development and political 
stability. Suharto needed the Chinese entrepreneurs in general for two interrelated 
goals. First of all, as indicated by Wibowo, the government needed to create 
employment during the period of economic devastation in the late 1960s, and the 
Chinese entrepreneurs were the ones who had the means and capabilities to do so.
 
167 
The government’s role, therefore, was to provide incentives through means such as 
concessions for the Chinese-dominated private sector to grow healthily. The other 
goal, however, was more deeply political - in order to secure his strategic position, 
Suharto had to maintain the support of the Indonesian army, the largest and most 
powerful of all branches of the Indonesian military. To do so, Suharto relied on the 
Chinese business community to fund this relationship.168 Thus the partnership between 
the military and ethnic Chinese businessmen developed, in which the military 
provided them with facilities for the entrepreneurs to continue their business.169
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security, which was something that Chinese Indonesians in general did not have due to 
their political insignificance. This mechanism gave birth to what became known as the 
cukong system, where military personnel had such a relationship with a cukong, a 
pejorative term for an ethnic Chinese businessman who, as Jemma Purdey wrote it, 
would exchange money for security.170
 It should be noted that most ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs come from the Totok 
community. First of all, it is helpful to provide a general idea of the difference 
between Totok and Peranakan Chinese communities in socio-economic spheres during 
this time period: the Totok Chinese were more likely to be associated with 
entrepreneurial activities while the Peranakans showed a larger diversification of 
occupations, mostly being associated with paid employment and white-collar jobs as 
well as certain professions such as medicine, law, and engineering.
 The cukong system is one of the defining 
aspects of Indonesia’s crony capitalism under Suharto. 
171
 This differentiation was important in relation to the collective image of 
“Chineseness”, as Wang Gungwu called it, in the eyes of the indigenous majority. The 
stereotypical foreign characteristics of the Chinese mostly referred to the Totoks, 
whose cultural, linguistic, and even physical appearances tended to be more closely 
associated with mainland China, unlike the Peranakans were more similar to those of 
the Pribumi. It was the predominantly Totok Chinese business tycoons who not only 
became the most powerful entrepreneurs in the nation but also received extensive 
 As a reflection 
of these occupational differences, the two groups were more likely to reside in 
different urban areas. While the Totoks tended to remain in the urban areas’ historic 
Chinese quarters, the Peranakan Chinese were more widely spread out and lived in 
greater variety of houses, from small huts to suburban villas.   
                                                 
170 (Purdey 2006, 21) 
171 (Fryer and Jackson 1977, 265) 
66 
national media attention due to their role in the economy. This publicity factor, 
combined with the lack of representation of Chinese communities’ diversity to the 
Indonesian public, was also a detrimental factor that shaped the negative association of 
“Chineseness” with economic exploitation and corruption. 
 
Cukong-ism: The Case of Liem Soe Liong 
The essence of Indonesia’s crony capitalist system is the following: the closer 
someone to the center of power, the wealthier that person would be. This was 
precisely the case of those who were close to Suharto, Chinese or non-Chinese alike. 
Aside from Suharto’s family, however, the wealthiest Indonesians during this era were 
ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs who practiced the cukong system with none other than 
President Suharto himself. The extent of opportunities would be determined by one’s 
degree of relationship with the president, which would eventually determine his favor 
to certain individuals. 
To have a further understanding on this high-level cukong system 
phenomenon, it is necessary to examine the relationship between Indonesia’s most 
prominent cukong in the New Order era, and the nation’s ultimate ruler. Liem Soe 
Liong or Sudono Salim was the founder of the largest Indonesian conglomerate, the 
Salim Group, the country’s wealthiest person for decades, and the cukong of no other 
than President Soeharto himself. A first generation Chinese Indonesian from Fujian 
Province who migrated to central Java, he managed to conduct spectacular business 
expansions during the New Order era. By the early 1980s the Salim Group became the 
largest Indonesian business group, and by the early 1990s its total income were about 
US$ 9.9 billion with at least 427 affiliated companies and a total of 135,000 
employees, making it the largest conglomerate not only in the country but also in 
southeast Asia. According to Yuri Sato, there are at least two reasons for this massive 
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success, namely, “the high degree of business diversification and the monopolistic and 
oligopolistic positions in hold in so many businesses.”172
 The relationship between Liem and Suharto began not long after the republic 
gained its independence. During the period of Indonesian revolution in the 1940s, 
Liem helped the Indonesian army with basic logistic supplies. By the early 1950s he 
became a trusted army supplier, and had a chance to meet Lieutenant-Colonel 
Soeharto, who was then an officer assigned to the Diponegoro Territorial Army 
Division in Central Java. From then on Liem became Soeharto’s main supplier. 
Liem’s business expansion began in 1967, along with Soeharto’s rise to power. At the 
time Liem was in the export-import business, in which he accumulated enough capital 
foundation for his future business group by the early 1970s.  
 
Connection to Soeharto was indeed critical; for instance, his earliest success 
was in the export-import business of primary products with PT Waringin (Waringin 
Corporations). The corporation was granted license to “five times more coffee than the 
formal quota that the government allotted to coffee exporters.”173
When the New Order government promoted import-substitution industries in 
the late 1960s,
 Another company of 
his, PT Mega, was granted five percent commission by the government in the import 
of cloves. Again, both companies clearly received such concessions solely because of 
Liem’s relationship with the president. 
174
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Central Bank, a rare practice to non-state-owned corporations.175 PT Tarumatex was 
no different; to compete with a large number of new textile companies in the early 
1970s, the corporation received an order for uniforms from the Indonesian army worth 
US$ 1.7 million.176
 In her conclusion on a research about the Salim Group, Yuri Sato stated:  
 Government facilities were also enormous for his cement factory.  
 
“The ‘pursuit of market domination’ seen consistently throughout the 
development of the Salim Group can be understood as the manifestation of 
the group’s own power: ‘politically affiliated power’ and ‘conglomerate 
power.’ These two hallmarks of Salim Group have been possible because of 
Soeharto’s rise to power and because of the “full-set” industrialization 
strategy that has been promoted by the Soeharto’s government. In this sense 
the Salim Group is a symbolic economic actor of Indonesian during the 
Soeharto era.”177
 
 
 
Forest Czars: Bob Hasan and Prajogo Pangestu 
 Another distinctively prominent ethnic Chinese conglomerate owner was Bob 
Hasan, an Indonesian tycoon in the timber industry and a former Minister of Trade and 
Industry. Born in Semarang from a family of tobacco trader, The Kian Seng is a 
Peranakan Chinese who would later change his name to Mohamad Hasan when he 
embraced Islam.178
                                                 
175 Ibid, 215 
 The fact that he was a Muslim and of Peranakan descent may have 
set him apart from the typically Totok business tycoons, which was perhaps his ticket 
to occupy the ministry-level position in the cabinet. His long-time relationship with 
Suharto, like Liem, was again the key to economic and political power. Similar to 
Liem Soe Liong, Hasan met Suharto in the early period of the republic, when Suharto 
was commanding the army’s Diponegoro Division in Central Java. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid, 441 
178 Christopher Barr, "Bob Hasan, the Rise of Apkindo, and the Shifting Dynamics of Control in 
Indonesia's Timber Sector." Indonesia 65 (1998). http://cip.cornell.edu/cgi-
bin/dienst_redirect.pl?url=/UI/1.0/Summarize/seap.indo/1106953918 
69 
 Hasan’s main interest was in the forestry sector, in which he controlled about 
two million hectares of forestry concessions, mostly located in Kalimantan.179 This 
pursuit of domination began in the 1980s when Indonesian businessmen turned against 
the export of raw logs to Japan’s plywood industry. As Indonesia’s dominating buyer, 
Japan at the time had the power to determine wholesale price. As a response, 
Indonesia banned the exports of raw logs and created its own plywood industry by 
forming Indonesian Wood Panel Association or Apkindo (Asosiasi Panel Kayu 
Indonesia), a national marketing body that controlled plywood exports.180 Under his 
leadership, Apkindo successfully decreased Japanese companies’ monopsony in 
national plywood industry. This position eventually brought him to the position of 
Minister of Trade and Finance in 1998, right before Suharto fell from power. He 
reportedly explained his business nationalism in his first conference as a minister by 
saying, “Monopolies are okay. As long as the monopoly serves in the interest of many 
people, it’s okay.”181 Not long after, Apkindo became a symbol of the New Order 
regime’s corruption, and Bob Hasan was brought to a widely publicized trial for 
corruption in 2000.182
 Another top crony of Suharto who dominated the forest-related industry was 
Prajogo Pangestu. Born Phang Djun Phen in West Kalimantan, Prajogo was a Totok 
businessman who became successful before building a relationship with Suharto. He 
began to approach the president through Suharto’s children who shared Pangestu’s 
interest in the timber industry, especially to liberate themselves from Bob Hasan’s 
 
                                                 
179 (Schwarz 2000, 140) 
180 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), 16. For more about Apkindo and the timber commodity industry in Kalimantan 
during the New Order regime see Gellert, Paul K. “Renegotiating Timber Commodity Chain: Lessons 
from Indonesia on the Political Construction of Global Commodity Chains.” Sociological Forum 18(1) 
(March, 2003): 53-84. 
181 (Barr 1998, 1) 
182 “Suharto crony brought to trial.” BBC World News, September 20, 2000, retrieved November 20, 
2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/933722.stm. 
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domination. As noted by Adam Schwarz, “In Indonesia, the only way to combat a 
crony is to become one.”183
 Pangestu’s connection with Suharto’s children became an entry point to 
approach the president. He partly financed the president’s autobiography and several 
projects that pleased Mrs. Tien Suharto; more importantly, he contributed US$ 220 
million to bail out Suharto’s Bank Duta in late 1990.
 This was the path Pangestu took, and Suharto’s eldest 
daughter Siti Hadrianti Rukmana and his middle son Bambang Trihatmodjo joined 
him in doing so. 
184 This effort certainly tightened 
the bond with the president and by 1991 he accumulated about 505 million hectares of 
forest concession areas, a size slightly larger than Denmark.185 In 1993, one of the 
companies controlled by Pangestu, PT Barito Pacific Timber, was the largest company 
on the Jakarta Stock Exchange.186 Even in 2007 Prajogo Pangestu still held the 13th 
richest Indonesian according to Forbes Magazine.187
 It should be noted that not all ethnic Chinese tycoons in the Suharto era were 
part of the cukong system. However, it is fair to say that the vast majority of 
Indonesia’s top ten business groups were founded by those who maintained close 
relationship with either government or military officials, if not directly with the 
president himself. Along with Liem Soe Liong, Bob Hasan, and Prajogo Pangestu, 
names such as Eka Tjipta Widjaja (Oey Ek Tjhong), William Soeryadjaya (Tjia Kian 
Liong), Mochtar Riady (Lee Mo Tie), Suhargo Gondokusumo, (Go Ka Him), and The 
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186 Michael Richardson, "A Giant Joins Jakarta Exchange," International Herald Tribune, January 10, 
1993, retrieved November 20, 2008 from http://www.iht.com/articles/1993/10/01/jak.php 
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Ning King were on the top ten list of Indonesia’s wealthiest business leaders in 
1992;188
 
 all were involved in the practice of crony capitalism. 
Anti-Chinese Violence 
 By the early 1970s, many elements within society began to notice the negative 
effect of a combination between the cukong system and a liberal economic system that 
loosely controlled the influx of foreign investment. University students, who 
supported the overthrowing of Sukarno’s corrupt regime in the mid 1960s, realized 
that eradication of corruption was not the government’s main priority.189 The 
cosmopolitan Pribumi business community was also concerned with the cukong 
system, particularly in relation to the flood of foreign investment inflow that often 
benefited ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs due to their connections with the power. In the 
historically heated competition between indigenous and Chinese conglomerates, this 
trend infuriated the indigenous entrepreneurs who, besides the few who enjoyed close 
relationships with Suharto and his family,190 were left behind in having business 
opportunities.191 For instance, in the mid 1990s, an estimated seventy-five percent of 
the foreign investors who set up joint ventures in Indonesia chose an ethnic Chinese-
owned firm as their local partner.192 Moreover, the heavy foreign investment led to 
serious loss in labor-intensive factories run by Pribumi entrepreneurs to the capital-
intensive plants set up by foreign investors and their ethnic Chinese partners.193
                                                 
188 See Table I: Indonesia’s Ten Largest Business Groups, 1992 in (Sato 1993, 409) 
  
189 (Schwarz 2000, 33) 
190 Ibid, 142. The largest indigenous business groups were, in fact, owned by Suharto’s children. 
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 This phenomenon certainly strengthened the economic position of ethnic 
Chinese in key industries, which aggravated the resentment felt by many non-Chinese. 
This agitation was also shared by several senior army officers who favored a higher 
degree of economic nationalism in policymaking, reminiscent to the Sukarno period’s 
PP 10 of 1959 implementation.194
 Anti-Chinese sentiments had occurred since the beginning of the New Order 
period. Several documented acts of anti-Chinese involved different segments of 
society including military paratroopers, such as in Jakarta’s Glodok Chinatown area in 
1968, student-demonstrators that vandalized Chinese properties in Surabaya in the 
same year, and Muslim groups in the city of Manado in 1970.
 The government eventually responded by 
establishing state-owned enterprises (Badan Usaha Milik Negara) in several key 
industries in the early 1980s, although it did not decrease the economic power of the 
ethnic Chinese tycoons. 
195 A more significant 
incident involving mobs of urban poor occurred in Bandung in 1973 that killed one 
person and damaged about 1500 Chinese houses and shops.196
However, none of these anti-Chinese sentiments shared the frustration of 
university students and Pribumi business circles, which was the case in what to be 
known as the Malari Incident. In January 1974 Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei 
Tanaka visited Indonesia. Japan was the nation’s largest investor at the time, and 
therefore the Prime Minister was a particularly important guest for the government. 
During negotiations between Suharto and the Prime Minister at the National Palace, 
thousands of students demonstrated on the streets of Jakarta, calling for reduction of 
prices, the end of corruption, and the disband of Suharto’s private assistants (staf 
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pribadi) who many accused for being instrumental in accommodating corrupt 
practices in the government.197
 The demonstrations turned violent when mobs stopped motor vehicles, 
particularly those made by Japanese companies, and ordered the passengers to get out 
before vehicles would be burned. The mobs also targeted the showrooms of Toyota, 
whose local partner was William Soerjadjaja’s Astra Group.
  
198 Then they turned their 
attention to Chinese shops, particularly the Chinese-dominated commercial area of 
Pasar Senen, whose four-story building was burned.199
 The Malari Incident became a turning point for Suharto to tighten his grip of 
power, particularly in the political realm. Suharto dismissed the military personnel 
who supported economic nationalism, who were mostly from the old 1945 generation, 
and replaced them with new graduates from the Magelang Military Academy.
 
200 
Suharto also took measures to gradually depoliticize Indonesian society by giving 
more power to the state apparatus. Some of the measures taken by the government 
included the arrest of many student leaders and prominent independent public figures 
and the coercion of strict regulation by the Minister of Education and Culture on 
student-led demonstrations outside and within university campuses. It also imposed a 
newly formulated Pancasila indoctrination document called the Guidelines for 
Instilling and Implementing Pancasila (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan 
Pancasila) or the P4 to create ideological conformity on the state philosophy.201
 The demands of nationalist and interventionist ideas in economic policy-
making resulted in several changes. Foreign investment regulations were once again 
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tightened where investors were obligated to form joint ventures with local partners, 
and trade and industry policy was redirected towards import substituting 
industrialization led by the state.202 This led to the rise of state-owned enterprises such 
as Krakatau Steel and the state-owned oil company Pertamina.203
 However, this change in favor of the indigenous business class did not have 
any effect on ending the targeting of Chinese properties and individuals by other 
elements of society during times of dissent, such as Islamic youth groups and the 
urban poor. When the New Order government relaxed some restrictions against 
collective expressions of political and social aspirations in the early 1990s, sporadic 
acts of anti-Chinese violence increasingly occurred in various parts of the nation, 
particularly toward the last three years of the New Order regime.
 
204
 The urban poor made a large part of Indonesia’s workforce who moved into 
the urban manufacturing sector. Along with this migration, the frequency of labor 
unrest intensified, particularly in the mid 1990s. In 1994, for example, about 150,000 
workers went on strike, compared with just 1,000 in 1989.
 
205 The main cause of this 
was the problem of underemployment. Although the official employment level was 
low, a World Bank report in 1996 estimated that more than a third of Indonesia’s 90 
million-strong labor force was working less than 35 hours per week.206 Moreover, the 
unemployment trend showed that in the mid 1990s young Indonesians between the 
ages of 15 and 24 accounted only for twenty percent of the workforce, but seventy 
percent of the unemployed.207
                                                 
202 Ibid, 37 
 In 1996, Juwono Sudarsono, the then deputy governor 
of the National Defense Institute, noted, “It’s the urban poor who are the most 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid, 24 
205 Ibid. 
206 (Schwarz 2000, 312) 
207 Ibid. 
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deprived and therefore the most volatile, and it’s not difficult to incite them to 
violence. It happened in 1974, it happened in 1996 and you may not have to wait 
another twenty years for it to happen again.”208
 By the 1990s the issue of socio-economic inequity became entangled with the 
issue of ethnicity, with the dichotomy becoming that of the Chinese rich and the 
Pribumi poor.
 Only two years after, the urban poor 
participated in the May 1998 Riots, which included the raping and killings of ethnic 
Chinese Indonesians. 
209 This resentment increased toward the end of the 1990s when 
increased racial tensions occurred; according to Michael Vatikiotis, the Chinese were 
said “to behave too exclusively, and were lending a bad image to the majority of 
Indonesian Chinese – not all of whom were rich and well-connected.”210 The Chinese 
as a collective identity became associated with enormous wealth and the corrupt 
regime. The existing cukong system combined with the day-to-day bribery in which 
Chinese Indonesians had to involve became prevalent in all levels of society, from 
conglomerates seeking protection to military members or government bureaucrats to 
small shopkeepers paying local military officials.211
 Vernon Turner wrote, “The fact that it was possible to arouse anti-Chinese 
sentiments so easily was a barometer of the explosive nature of Indonesian-Chinese 
relations.”
 
212
                                                 
208 (Schwarz 2000, 312) 
 Despite the fact that President Suharto’s market-generated economic 
growth in the 1980s and 1990s increased the per capita income of the Pribumi 
majority, there was a pervasive belief that Suharto’s market liberalization favored the 
209 (Vatikiotis 1993, 170) 
210 Ibid, 178 
211 (Purdey 2006, 21) 
212 (Turner 1974, 395) 
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“already rich” Sino-Indonesians at the expense of indigenous Indonesians.213 The 
word “Chinese”, according an interviewee to Schwarz in 1989, became synonymous 
with the word “corruption”.214
  The position of ethnic Chinese Indonesians during the New Order era, 
therefore, is difficult to discuss due to their ambiguous position within society. On one 
hand, they were oppressed by the government through its discriminative assimilation 
policy. On the other hand, the non-Chinese Indonesians saw the Chinese as 
benefactors of a corrupt regime at the expense of the majority. This ambiguity was a 
reflection of the nature of Suharto’s New Order regime, whose approach to political, 
social, and economic issues was based on the pragmatic goal of staying in power.  
Needless to say, the Suharto regime intensified the historical schisms between Chinese 
Indonesians and indigenous Indonesians throughout its 32 years of rule. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CHINESE INDONESIAN MOVEMENTS  
IN THE REFORM ERA: 1998 - 2008 
 
 This chapter will analyze what was known as the Chinese Indonesian 
Movements during the post-Suharto era. These movements refer to the emergence of 
social and political activisms by various ethnic Chinese organizations during the past 
one decade from 1998 to 2008. 
 The word “movement” may suggest that there was a collective activism by 
various groups of people in promoting a common cause. Chinese Indonesian activism, 
however, was a phenomenon in which independent groups promoted different aspects 
of Chinese Indonesian interests. Many were less concerned to create one large ethnic 
Chinese organization that promoted the interests of all Chinese Indonesians. Thus, 
they will intentionally be referred to as “movements” because there is no single, 
collective movement representing this phenomenon. 
Furthermore, not all activisms involving the ethnic Chinese desire to be seen as 
a part of these “Chinese” movements. Many groups, for instance, argue that they 
simply promote equal rights for all ethnic minorities. The membership policy of many 
organizations is also not limited to ethnic Chinese and even encourages non-Chinese 
Indonesians to join their cause. Others, on the other hand, are solely focused on 
promoting the Chinese community’s interests and have an exclusively Chinese 
membership policy. 
The chapter is primarily focused on finding a common theme among these 
movements. It examines the main goal, objective, and philosophical justification of 
different activisms in the context of Indonesian nationhood. What is the primary 
message of these movements? What is the nature of their goals - is it simply to put 
80 
forward the interests of this minority group? Or does it have a larger implication 
within the framework of national identity? 
This is an important question for at least one reason: throughout history there 
has been much paranoia about the movements of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. From 
the national revolution era in the 1940s to the era of the New Order Regime, there was 
a tendency among Pribumi Indonesians to think of Chinese activisms as being too 
attached with the mainland. In other words, Chinese social and political activisms 
were often viewed as a reflection of Chinese chauvinism, which in turn emphasized 
the notion that the Chinese were aliens to Indonesians. Thus, it is interesting to study 
the main objectives of these contemporary Chinese movements, particularly from the 
perspective of the Chinese themselves, as an attempt to counter this perception among 
many Indonesians. 
What has been found in this study, however, is not only that these various 
movements share a common goal, but they also redefine the mainstream 
understanding of Indonesian identity. The main objective of these movements is to 
eradicate the notion of The Chinese Problem that had been promoted by the previous 
regime, and to change the negative perception of the Chinese that has been prevalent 
in Indonesian society. Essentially, these movements attempt to argue that the Chinese 
indeed share a sense of Indonesian nationhood, and have the unquestionable right to 
be treated as equal Indonesian citizens. 
 
Fall of the New Order Regime 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, anti-Chinese violence occurred 
throughout the New Order regime. Resentment against this minority group reached its 
climax toward the end of the regime rule in May 1998, when a popular uprising led to 
the downfall of Suharto from presidency. 
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The trigger for this political crisis was an economic one, namely the Asian 
Financial Crisis that began in 1997. 215 After about six months of economic crisis, 
various elements of society began to blame the Suharto government for the 
increasingly chronic price inflation of basic goods, food shortage, and mass 
unemployment in early 1998.216 This economic crisis turned into a political crisis 
particularly when Suharto was re-elected on March 11th, 1998, with his new cabinet 
consisting of family members and cronies.217
The demand for Suharto’s resignation became even more widespread after four 
student demonstrators from Jakarta’s Trisakti University were shot dead in their 
campus by mysterious snipers on May 12th.
 Demonstrations began to take place on 
campuses and in the streets of major Indonesian cities with students, workers, and 
intellectuals on the forefront of the movement, demanding Suharto’s resignation and a 
cabinet reshuffle. 
218 Within the next three days Jakarta 
became a site of mass student demonstrations and heavy military presence throughout 
the city, with more than 15,000 troops backed by tanks and armored vehicles deployed 
at vital locations.219
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 However, despite the presence of military troops, by May 18th 
tens of thousands of students occupied the grounds and buildings of Indonesia’s 
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DPR. Suharto announced his resignation on May 21st, 1998, marking an end of the 
New Order era and the beginning of Indonesia’s period of democratic reform. 
However, May 1998 is also remembered for another darker incident – namely, 
the riots that occurred in several major cities including Jakarta, Solo, Surabaya, 
Lampung, and Palembang. The violence, particularly in Jakarta, reached its peak from 
the 12th to the 15th of May, when mobs consisting primarily of the urban poor 
damaged and burned residential and commercial areas including shopping centers, 
office buildings, and car showrooms. These series of events took more than 1100 
lives,220 with more than one thousand people trapped in shopping malls and killed by 
the fire in Jakarta and Solo.221
The targeting of Chinese Indonesians was confirmed by the report of Habibie 
government’s on the subject, which was better known as the TGPF Report.
 What the May 1998 Riots are most remembered for, 
however, is the targeting of Chinese Indonesian individuals and their properties by the 
non-Chinese mobs. The type of damage included material damage, death and injuries, 
kidnapping victims, and most controversially, sexual harassment and rape. 
222 It 
indicated that gang rape was the dominating form of sexual violence, and most 
victims, although not all, were women of ethnic Chinese descent with various socio-
economic backgrounds.223 Chinese Indonesian victims were also reported to suffer the 
most material damage.224
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triggered by certain elements that could be categorized under the provocateur group 
(kelompok provokator), namely individuals who were highly trained in weapons, 
demonstrated high mobility with transportation, and used electronic communication 
systems such as cell phones and handy talkies.225 These groups provoked hundreds of 
people in the area who in turn became aggressive and began looting and burning shops 
and residents “in an organized way.”226
By this statement the TGPF Report suggests the widespread allegation that the 
May 1998 Riots were instigated by certain elements in the military. The alleged 
military involvement was related to an elite power struggle between two opposing 
factions within the army on the issue of presidential succession.
 
227 The leaders of the 
two factions were Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto, then the Commander of 
Kostrad (Army Strategic Reserve) who was also then the son-in-law of Suharto, and 
General Wiranto, at the time the Minister of Defense and a close associate to the 
president.228 Analysts speculated that Prabowo instigated violence with the help of his 
close ally Major General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, the Operations Commander for Greater 
Jakarta (Pangkoops Raya), whose position granted him considerable control over 
military operations in the capital.229 The violence was suspected to have two aims: to 
terrorize the opponents of the government and, perhaps more importantly, to 
demonstrate the incompetence of Wiranto as a commander in controlling disorder.230
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Yet, when resigning on May 21st, 1998, Suharto chose to take the constitutional path 
by transferring his power to Vice President B.J. Habibie, bypassing the two opposing 
military figures. 
Whoever the real perpetrators were, the violence shocked the majority of 
Indonesians, particularly the Chinese population. According to Leo Suryadinata, there 
were three major impacts of the violence toward the Chinese communities in the 
affected urban areas. The first impact was an exodus of ethnic Chinese out of Jakarta 
to other towns or out of the country. From May 14th to the 21st, about 152,000 people 
fled out of the country, an estimated 70,800 were Indonesian citizens; most were likely 
to be ethnic Chinese.231 Second, the violence generated capital flight along with the 
ethnic Chinese exodus. The Chinese, who were mostly upper-middle class, took with 
them an estimated US$ 30 to 60 billion, while an Indonesian source claimed that the 
number was closer to US$ 110 billion.232
The third, according to Suryadinata, is what will be the focus of the rest of this 
chapter – namely, an increasing political and social consciousness among Chinese 
Indonesians that led to what historian Johanes Herlijanto called the Social Movements 
of Chinese Indonesians. 
 This phenomenon would soon haunt the new 
Indonesian government in their struggle to improve the nation’s economic condition, 
which has always desperately needed the capital owned by ethnic Chinese 
Indonesians. 
 
The early period of Reform Era 
Indonesians quickly called the post-Suharto period The Reform Era (Era 
Reformasi). The first year of the Reform Era was a euphoric time in Indonesian 
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politics. After 32 years under dictator rule, the symbolic act of the students toppling 
the regime brought a widespread optimism that political power had finally come back 
to the hands of the people. Furthermore, the experience under authoritarian rule had 
enlightened the public to be actively involved in politics. The main significance of the 
reform movement, according to Jemma Purdey, was that it was “the greatest shift in 
Indonesian politics in over 30 years.”233
 In many ways, this call for democracy was made possible by the successive 
government under the leadership of President Burhannudin Jusuf Habibie, who was an 
engineer with little experience in politics. He served in a series of Suharto’s Cabinet as 
the Minister of Technology and Research for 20 years before being promoted to Vice 
Presidency only months before Suharto stepped down. His inexperience in politics 
was further complicated by the fact that he was a civilian, which means that he lacked 
the military support that Suharto had, nor was he an eloquent speaker as Sukarno 
was.
 
234 Perhaps as he realized his relatively weak political position, Habibie decided 
to cater to the contemporary popular spirit of democratic reform in order to gather 
public support. Not long after he took presidency, Habibie took steps to liberalize 
public life by giving Indonesia’s civil society two of its basic rights - the freedom of 
association and free expression.235
 The consequence was enormous as fear, anger, and hatred that had been 
repressed for so long were suddenly allowed to be expressed. This new openness led 
to a mosaic of interests projected in various forms and degrees of intensity, from mere 
verbal frustrations on the media and internet to the fight for control of jobs, resources, 
and territories, and for the overthrow of opposing parties from power in the municipal 
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and provincial-level political scenes. Communal violence broke out in the islands of 
Sulawesi, Ambon, Halmahera, and Kalimantan, causing more loss of human lives and 
the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians across the archipelago.236 A few 
years later, separatist attempts in Aceh and Papua gained widespread public attention, 
bringing to the public debate the discourse about Indonesian unity.237 Aside from 
regionalism and communal interests, political Islam also re-emerged as it quickly 
gained support from all levels of society; new groups offered their own interpretation 
of Islam and the different degrees of incorporation of violence.238
At the same time, however, this new openness led to the re-emergence of civil 
rights movements in the country. As the government was to hold a national 
parliamentary election on June 7th, 1999, new parties blossomed almost overnight with 
various reform agendas, including the demand to revise the constitution, the reduction 
of Golkar’s political power, and an end to Habibie’s presidency due to his connection 
with Suharto. Other popular issues among political parties and non-governmental 
organizations alike included the advocacy to assist the poor, to demand reform in the 
legal system, to prosecute Suharto, and to separate police and military powers.
 
239 
Demonstrations against human rights violations, for equality, transparency, and other 
concerns became annual events in the capital and other major cities.240
 
 New media 
publications reflecting alternative views on social and political issues appeared 
ubiquitously, and new faces of public figures with different intellectual qualifications 
took their chances to express their views in this new era of openness. 
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The Habibie Goernment and the May 1998 Violence 
This spirit of celebrating freedom of expression opened an opportunity for 
Chinese Indonesians to voice their concerns and interests, in which they quickly 
participated. The first and foremost concern of the minority group was the new 
government’s response to the horrific violence that ethnic Chinese suffered during the 
May 1998 Riots. Chinese Indonesians demanded for a thorough investigation and to 
bring the perpetrators to trial.  
Aside from having the advantage of the new openness, the Chinese 
Indonesians’ demand for justice was also supported by national and international 
human rights groups who viewed the May 1998 violence as a crime against 
humanity.241 The incident put Indonesia under the spotlight in the international arena, 
receiving condemnations particularly from ethnic Chinese communities around the 
world.242
In response, the Habibie government formed a forensic and fact-finding group 
called Joint Fact-Finding Team (Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta) or the (TGPF) in July, 
to investigate the May 1998 violence, particularly relating to the possibility that such 
 China, Taiwan, and the government of the United States on behalf of the 
Chinese communities demanded the Habibie government conduct a thorough 
investigation of the violence. Aside from being a matter of diplomatic importance, the 
Chinese issue also became a test for the government’s moral accountability in front of 
its own citizens as many non-Chinese Indonesians also took sympathy in the ethnic 
Chinese cause. 
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attacks were systematically planned and organized by certain factions of the 
government.243 In addition, Habibie also issued a Presidential Instruction to reinforce a 
poorly socialized Presidential Decree number 55 of 1996 that abolished the function of 
the notoriously discriminative document SBKRI.244
The status of the Joint Fact-Finding Team report as the government’s official 
version on the topic, however, is often viewed with scrutiny in terms of the data 
accountability and factual basis of its analyses.
 
245 Those who seek a more complete 
picture often rely on alternative sources resulting from investigations independent 
from government involvement. Among the most comprehensive investigations was the 
one conducted by a non-governmental organization Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa or SNB 
(Homeland Solidarity), whose legal analyses were supported with meticulous facts 
showing how the riots could be viewed as an organized crime against humanity.246
Formed on June 5, 1998, this organization was initially a spontaneous reaction 
to help the victims of the riots.
 
247
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 Under the leadership of Esther Jusuf, a young ethnic 
Chinese lawyer who became one of the most prominent experts on the topic of the 
May 1998 Riots, SNB dedicates itself to promoting the eradication of discriminative 
policies based on ethnicity toward Indonesian citizens. The SNB itself does not claim 
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to be an ethnic-based organization, and emphasizes its mission to fight against all 
kinds of racism in Indonesia. However, partly due to the history of its formation and 
the leadership of Esther Yusuf as a prominent Chinese Indonesian activist, the SNB 
has often been attached to a series of movements that historian Johanes Herlijanto 
calls the “ethnic Chinese Social Movements in Indonesia”.248
 
 
The Emergence of Ethnic Chinese Social Movements 
Almost immediately after the fall of Suharto, Chinese Indonesians began to 
take an active role in socio-political activism. Some decided to form new 
sociopolitical organizations that specifically promoted or let their agenda be 
dominated by ethnic Chinese interests. Leo Suryadinata categorizes these movements 
into three types of organizational forms: political party, social organization, and youth 
organizations and associations.249
One of the earliest ethnic Chinese parties was the Indonesian Chinese Reform 
Party, or PARTI (Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia) that was established in 
Jakarta on June 5, 1998.
 
250 Formed by a group of young Chinese Indonesians under 
the leadership of 39-year-old Lieus Sungkharisma (Li Xuexiong), the party stated its 
goal as being to promote racial harmony and protect the interests of Chinese 
Indonesians.251
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 The formation of PARTI was followed by the Indonesian Assimilation 
Party, or PARPINDO (Partai Pembauran Indonesia), established by an ethnic Chinese 
convert Jusuf Hamka (A Bun). The party gained the support of Junus Jahja, a 
prominent Chinese Muslim who was active in the LPKB, the proponents of 
assimilative approach as a solution to The Chinese Problem. As indicated by the name, 
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the party aimed to promote the assimilation of ethnic Chinese Indonesians into the 
Pribumi Indonesian culture. PARPINDO’s assimilation approach, however, was 
unpopular among ethnic Chinese communities since it is associated with Suharto’s 
assimilation project. Soon after, the political party transformed itself into a social 
organization. 
Another political party formed by ethnic Chinese was the Indonesian Unity in 
Diversity Party, or PBI (Partai Bhineka Tunggal Ika Indonesia), that was formed on 
July 1st, 1998. Led by Nurdin Purnomo (Wu Nengbin), a 50-year-old of Hakka 
descent, the party’s first and foremost immediate goal has been to push the 
government to conduct total reform in the regulatory field by canceling and erasing all 
the presidential decrees, instructions, or other forms of regulations that consist ethnic, 
religious, and racial discrimination.252 The party stated, “The racial riots that occurred 
on May 13th – 15th, 1998 also become an inspiration for a group of people, particularly 
those of ethnic Chinese minority, to establish a forum that can absorb their aspirations 
and rights so that such ethnic violence will not be repeated again. It has been quite a 
long time when Indonesian Citizens of ethnic Chinese descent have always been the 
scapegoats for the political games of the authority.”253
These parties emerged along with hundreds of other new parties across the 
nation to participate in the parliamentary election that was to be held in June 1999. 
Some ethnic Chinese, however, decided to participate in politics by joining non-
Chinese political parties and eventually they became successful in their political 
career. A notable example is Kwik Kian Gie, a prominent ethnic Chinese economist 
who chose to stay in Megawati’s Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan) or PDI-P. Kwik was eventually appointed President 
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Abdurrahman Wahid cabinet’s coordinating Minister of Finance and Industry in 1999, 
the highest cabinet position that an ethnic Chinese has ever obtained in Indonesia’s 
history. Kwik was re-elected for the same position and became the Head of the 
National Planning Body under Wahid’s successor Megawati in 2001. Several 
prominent ethnic Chinese political figures followed Kwik’s path in entering politics by 
joining mainstream political parties. Among them were pro-assimilation leaders K. 
Sindhunata and former Parpindo leader Junus Jahja, who joined the National Mandate 
Party (Partai Amanat Nasional) or PAN.254
Many other Chinese Indonesians, however, chose to stay away from politics by 
forming non-political organizations. One of the pioneers was Brigadier General Tedy 
Jusuf, one of the very few ethnic Chinese Indonesians who joined the Indonesian 
Police Force under the Suharto regime. The retired general established the Indonesia 
Chinese Social Association (Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia) or PSMTI 
on September 29, 1998. PSMTI’s missions have been to promote awareness of ethnic 
Chinese rights among Indonesians, to promote the elimination of discriminatory 
policies toward the minority group, and to encourage ethnic Chinese Indonesians 
interact with mainstream society.
 Another ethnic Chinese politician was 
Alvin Lie, a member of the People’s Representatives from PAN. 
255
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 Instead of conducting political activism, PSMTI 
has chosen social work as their primary means of achieving their goals. PSMTI also 
provides aid or accommodation for victims of natural disasters, communities who are 
facing lawsuit problems, those who need medical aid (who are referred to hospitals 
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affiliated with the organization), and those communities whose children cannot 
continue their formal education.256
Not long after PSMTI was founded, however, an internal disagreement led a 
number of members to leave the organization. On April 10, 1999 these former 
members established the Chinese Indonesian Association or Perhimpunan INTI 
(Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa). Under the leadership of Eddie Lembong (Wan 
Youshan), a pharmacist who was active in the new Chinese movements, this 
organization today has the largest membership of all ethnic Chinese organizations. 
Similar to PSMTI, INTI aims to promote solidarity between ethnic Chinese and 
indigenous Indonesians and contribute to the country’s development.
 
257 Also similarly 
to PSMTI, INTI focuses with social work, from providing health care service to 
offering educational opportunities, while emphasizing its non-affiliation with any 
political party. They state on their official website that the organization “is not 
affiliated with any existing political parties and neither does it commit itself to 
them.”258 Furthermore, the web site states that INTI “is open to all Indonesian 
citizens”259 and seeks “to mobilize the potentials of Chinese Indonesian for the sake of 
the joint understanding to rebuild the Indonesian nation.”260
The third category is the youth organizations and associations that often 
function as non-governmental organizations. These major organizations include the 
Chinese Youth Solidarity for Justice or SIMPATIK (Solidaritas Pemuda Pemudi 
Tionghoa Untuk Keadilan), the Anti-Discrimination Movement or GANDI (Gerakan 
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Anti Diskriminasi), and the Committee of Social Concern of Surabaya or Kalimas 
(Komite Aliansi Kepedulian Masyarakat Surabaya). The most well-established of all 
arguably Esther Jusuf’s  Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa and the Indonesian Commission on 
Violence Against Women (Komisi Nasional Anti-Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan) 
under the supervision of University of Indonesia professor Saparinah Sadli. Their 
activities vary from political activism to social work. Many of them are formed and 
led by Chinese Indonesians, but often do not aim to be associated exclusively with 
only promoting Chinese interests. Thus, these particular type of organizations will not 
be discussed in length in this study. 
According to Benny G. Setiono, one of the founders and leaders of INTI, 
contemporary Chinese organizations in Indonesia can be divided into two main groups 
that follow the traditional dichotomy of ethnic Chinese communities in Indonesia- 
namely Totok organizations and Peranakan organizations.261
The trend was followed by Totok Chinese to form their separate organizations. 
The types of Totok organizations can be categorized by the following: 1) place of 
origin associations, such as those from Fujian and Yongchung, 2) surname 
associations, such as Rin and Yu, 3) organizations of religious affiliation, such as 
Confucianism or Buddhism, 4) alumni associations of Chinese language schools pre-
 He suggested that 
Chinese organizations that were formed earlier in the post-Suharto era, which include 
all the previous political parties, organizations, and associations mentioned above, 
were dominated by Peranakan Chinese. Some organizations, such as SNB, PSMTI, 
and INTI, are still active and developing until today, while others are less active or 
fading away. 
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1967, when they were closed by the New Order regime, and 5) social organizations.262 
In mild criticism, Benny Setiono mentioned, “If the organizations among the 
Peranakans were clear in terms of their vision and mission of struggle, these Totok 
organizations’ “vision and mission” are unclear, most of them are only for the purpose 
of socializing, reunion for school alumni, dinner, nostalgic activities or karaoke with 
its members.”263
Setiono’s assertion has some truth in it; many of the Totok organizations are 
not established with a specific social or political agenda to promote. However, it is 
worthy to put this phenomenon in perspective by acknowledging that now Chinese 
Indonesians can associate themselves under an organization that publicly celebrate 
their ancestral heritage. In addition, during my personal interview with Benny Setiono, 
he was pleased by the fact that many Totok community leaders support INTI’s role to 
be the leading organization that represents ethnic Chinese interests as a whole. He 
added, “It is true that they may not have the vision (on how to integrate ethnic Chinese 
into Indonesian society), but they continue to support through financial means, and 
trust the activities to the Peranakans who know how to do it.”
 
264
 
 
Successive Governments and the Ethnic Chinese: 2001-2008 
Despite Habibie’s accommodative gestures to the Chinese communities and 
the Indonesian people as a whole, he lost his presidential seat after the Golkar Party 
suffered tremendous loss during the June 1999 parliamentary elections. Habibie’s 
successor was a prominent Muslim cleric Abdurrahman Wahid, the senior leader of 
Indonesia’s largest Islamic mass organization Nahdlatul Ulama, and the chairman of 
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the newly formed National Awakening Party (PKB). Although receiving much 
criticism toward his style of leadership and lack of experience in parliamentary 
politics, Wahid is most remembered by the Chinese Indonesian communities for his 
moderate stance on humanitarian issues and his dedication in accommodating the 
aspirations of minority groups. During his leadership Wahid issued Presidential 
Decree No. 6/2000 that revoked the humiliating Presidential Instruction No. 14/1967 
that regulated Chinese religion, beliefs, and traditions, effectively banning any 
Chinese literature or the practice of Chinese culture in Indonesia, including the use of 
Chinese characters.265
The next two presidents, Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, continued these gestures of accommodation toward the Chinese 
Indonesian minorities. Megawati, who served as president from 2001 to 2004, issued a 
decree that made Chinese New Year celebration (Tahun Baru Imlek) a national 
holiday.
 The evocation of this regulation re-allowed the celebration of 
Chinese traditions, such as the Chinese New Year and performances such as dragon 
dances and lion dances, to be celebrated in public. Wahid even claimed that among his 
ancestors were of Chinese descent. 
266 Under the leadership of Megawati’s successor Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, who began serving in 2004, Confucianism was once more officially 
recognized as a religion and not merely a belief system, implying a much weaker legal 
position under Indonesian law. He also amended the sixth verse of the National 
Constitution or UUD 1945 that required the presidential seat to be reserved only for 
indigenous Indonesians.267
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Chinese but also other racial minorities in the national political scene. Other regulative 
changes include the replacement of the Sukarno-era Dual Citizenship Agreement with 
China (UU Kewarganegaraan No. 2/1958) with a new regulation (Undang-Undang 
Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia No. 12/2006), another highlight for the status 
of ethnic Chinese Indonesians.268 Under the old law, the status of Indonesian citizens 
was sub-categorized as a Citizen (Warga Negara) and a Citizen of Foreign Descent 
(Warga Negara Keturunan). Such extended categorization was then indicated on one’s 
national identity card through specific codes. Thus, Citizens of Foreign Descent, 
which almost exclusively referred to ethnic Chinese, would be required to present the 
infamous SBKRI document. By stating that “there’s only Indonesian citizens (Warga 
Negara Indonesia) and non-Indonesian citizens (Warga Negara Asing),”269
The re-examination of some of the most symbolically discriminative policies 
received great response from national and international audience alike. International 
Herald Tribune in December 2006 wrote: 
 the new 
law abolished the sub-categorization and therefore it was a major legal triumph for 
ethnic Chinese Indonesians. 
 
“After centuries of segregation, periodic violence and tension over their 
higher levels of wealth, Indonesia’s Chinese community, which makes up to 
1 or 2 percent of the population of 245 million, is now enjoying what many 
are calling a golden era… The country has redefined what it means to be a 
“native.“270
 
 
Another important aspect is what the article claimed as a changing Indonesian 
mentality toward the Chinese, moving further from the notion that all Indonesian 
Chinese are rapaciously rich. The article ended by citing the comment by Susanto, an 
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ethnic Chinese whole-sale dealer, who claimed that “day to day there is no 
discrimination… I think we have a good future here.”271
 
 Whether or not this claim is 
true, there is a clear sense of optimism among Chinese Indonesians that things have 
changed for the better for them in Indonesia. 
Challenges in the Social Movements: Ten Years of Assessment 
Not all ethnic Chinese agree with such optimism, however. Political scientist 
Christine Sussana Tjhin of CSIS, for instance, criticized the much-hyped February 
2006 celebration of Chinese New Year. While many referred to this celebration as a 
“victory” to Chinese Indonesians for “gaining recognition” and that it signifies the 
“resinification” of Chinese Indonesians as their legal rights, she wrote in Kompas 
newspaper that “(i)t serves as a symbolic purpose only visible on the surface.”272
Tjhin is not alone in this sentiment; two years later, for instance, the respected 
Pribumi-owned daily Suara Pembaruan wrote that many Chinese Indonesians still 
need to provide SBKRI to issue legal documents.
 She 
argued that aside from the much-hyped government reform, issues such as trial of May 
1998 perpetrators, discrimination in Chinese Indonesians’ participation in politics, and 
even the old problems with government officials in issuing legal documents still 
remain unsolved. 
273 The head of the National Human 
Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) Ifdal Kasim (whose interview was featured in the 
article) blamed poor government response regarding this matter.274
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erase discrimination to minorities.275 In a seminar by INTI, lawyer and activist Franz 
Hendra Winarta stated, “On legal basis, ethnic Chinese are no longer being 
(discriminated). But in practice, until today, ethnic Chinese are still being 
discriminated, such as in receiving bureaucratic service (by state apparatus), including 
their attempt to join the bureaucracy (as a public servant).”276
As of December 2008, the problem with SBKRI has not seemed to improve 
much. A survey conducted by the Indonesian Foundation for Legal Studies or YPHI 
(Yayasan Pengkajian Hukum Indonesia) stated that 107 out of 114 ethnic Chinese 
Indonesians in four major cities claimed that they still have to present the document 
whenever applying for identity cards, passports, and other official documents.
 
277
 
 
 Furthermore, according to the study, in addition to the SBKRI Chinese 
Indonesians are often required to pay an extra amount of 1 million rupiah when 
applying for an official document. For ethnic Chinese Indonesians, this survey 
suggests a questionable commitment of the government in eradicating the long-lasting 
major problems regarding ethnic Chinese, including their status of citizenship. 
National or Ethnic Orientation? 
On the other hand, Pribumi Indonesians have also questioned the re-emergence 
of ethnic Chinese Indonesian social and political consciousness, particularly on the 
orientation of new Chinese organizations and parties. Despite claims over their 
mainstream nationalist orientation, the problematic aspect of forming an ethnic based 
organization is that it opens the possibility to project communal identity such as 
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ethnicity above the more conventional Indonesian national identity. As a consequence, 
the emergence of ethnic Chinese social movements in the form of political parties did 
receive criticism from prominent Indonesian politicians when it began in 1998. This 
included the comments by future president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, then the head 
of the Armed Forces Political Affairs section, who stated, “There is no problem with 
the establishment of new parties. But one has to think very carefully, whether or not it 
is right to form parties which are based on most sensitive points: ethnicity, religion, 
and race.”278
This controversy about their involvement in politics also emerged among 
ethnic Chinese themselves. When answering an interview question on how necessary 
it is for Chinese Indonesians to have a formal organization, Brigadier General Tedy 
Jusuf emphasized: 
 
 
“… the primary mission is to promote our basic civil rights, not to struggle 
for political power, which is the mission of most … political parties … The 
Baperki tragedy cannot be repeated, (and) to anticipate it requires a strong 
adherence to the principle that ethnic organizations should not promote 
political aspirations, including practical politics, and only being involved in 
the social-related activities and promoting civil rights.”279
 
 
Referring to the fate of the major ethnic Chinese organization in the Sukarno 
era, Jusuf suggested that participation in politics would risk another persecution 
toward the Chinese by the Pribumi majority, and thus the Chinese should find other 
ways to promote their interests. 
Similarly, Kwik Kian Gie argued that the formation ethnic Chinese political 
parties was a setback for Indonesian nation-building. This was so because reviving the 
idea of an ethnic-based party would have a negative impact to nation building, as 
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Kwik argued that the majority of Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese were already integrated 
into mainstream society.280 A debate erupted between Kwik and Sofjan Wanandi, an 
ethnic Chinese tycoon who was appointed chairman of the National Economic 
Committee. When Wanandi urged the Chinese communities to support Kwik in order 
for him to represent their interest, Kwik countered that he represented the Indonesian 
people and not only the Chinese community, especially the interests of the Chinese 
business circle, which was closely associated with Wanandi.281 Comparing Kwik to 
those Chinese Indonesians such as Lieus Sungkharisma and Sofjan Wanandi, Leo 
Suryadinata wrote, “It is ironic to note that… Kwik Kian Gie, who retains his Chinese 
name, is in the vanguard of Indonesian nationalism.”282
Historian Johanes Herlijanto, on the other hand, argued that the non-Chinese 
majority must tolerate this orientation toward promoting ethnic Chinese interests 
particularly due to the fact that the ethnic Chinese communities in Indonesia have long 
suffered from the violence, discrimination, and other injustices due to their lack of 
political freedom. During the New Order regime, ethnic Chinese must relied on the 
government for protection from the hostile majority; nevertheless, this did not protect 
them from one of the worst violent incidents against Chinese Indonesians in its 
modern history. He stated, “The crisis of trust among some Chinese Indonesians on 
the state (is based on) their reactions against the incapability of the state and military 
to protect them during the riots. Though the reactions were varied, all have at least two 
important themes: (1) the state’s failure to guarantee their safety, and (2) the need for 
Chinese Indonesians to take some actions in order to prevent the same tragedy to 
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happen again in the future.”283 Similar to Herlijanto’s argument, Lieus Sungkarisma, 
the leader of The Indonesian Chinese Reform Party or PARTI, supported the 
participation in politics, hoping that “perhaps non-Chinese will see that Chinese 
Indonesians also care about the fate of this nation.”284 To him, there should be nothing 
wrong with the Chinese to display their “Chineseness”, since the most important thing 
was one’s commitment to the Indonesian state and nation.285
As seen above, there are different perspectives on what is the true meaning of 
the Chinese socio-political movements in post-Suharto Indonesia even among the 
Chinese Indonesians themselves. The issue of Chinese movements has been 
controversial in Indonesian history, and therefore there are many agitations from both 
non-Chinese and Chinese in interpreting the movement. How should the movements 
be viewed in the context of Indonesian nationalism? Are these phenomena truly the 
aspirations by Chinese Indonesians for equal rights as well as to participate in nation 
building, or are they merely means to achieve political power for chauvinistic 
purposes, such as demanding special rights as victims of the New Order regime & the 
1998 Riots? By asking this question, this study is not trying to justify the prejudice of 
many Pribumi Indonesians. It is merely interested with the possible consequences for a 
type of movement that has been historically controversial in the country. 
 
To understand the main purpose of these social movements, or more accurately 
socio-political movements, it is necessary to analyze the logical assumption behind the 
Chinese organizations’ claim to what they understand as Indonesian nationalism. In 
his essay, Johanes Herlijanto stated that the two main objectives of the Chinese 
movements were namely to get recognition of their ethnic identity and to put an end to 
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discriminative policies against them.286
In order to do so, it is necessary for Chinese Indonesians to assess the popular 
understanding of Indonesian nationalism among Pribumi Indonesians, particularly 
after 32 years of New Order rule, in which the regime had the sole power to interpret 
the meaning of nationalism. In the context of Suharto’s nationalism, The Chinese 
Problem is what makes the Chinese anything but being nationalistic. Communism, 
Chinese capitalism, Chinese religion and culture, have been seen as diverting from 
what defines Indonesian nationalism. As clearly explained in the previous chapters, 
Pribumi Indonesians generally view the history of Chinese movements as counter to 
Indonesian nationalism. The vast majority of non-Chinese and even Chinese 
Indonesians were unaware that the Chinese were involved in these struggles at all. For 
those who do know about the history, they may have viewed the involvement of the 
Chinese in the National Revolution as being overshadowed by the much-larger 
Chinese organizations with other orientations such as Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan and Sin 
Po group (Mainland oriented) or Chung Hwa Hui (Dutch oriented). Of course, the fact 
that the last major Chinese organization, Baperki, was involved with communism 
 In short, changing the negative perceptions 
toward the Chinese is at the center of these movements. This change of perception is a 
means to achieve a higher degree of tolerance toward them in the state level and 
societal level. In societal level, this tolerance would eventually lead the majority of 
Indonesians to recognize the Chinese’s unique ethnic identity without inherent 
prejudice against them. In the state level, tolerance would lead the government to 
abolish any discriminative policies. In other words, an improved degree of tolerance 
would be reflected in the policies and behavior that respect ethnic Chinese rights as 
Indonesian citizens. This is the new paradigm for tackling the Chinese Problem 
through active participation of the Chinese Indonesians themselves. 
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further stigmatized the idea of ethnic Chinese movements in the eyes of Pribumi 
Indonesians. 
Again, as indicated in earlier chapters, these negative perceptions have been 
largely influenced by the role of the Indonesian military regime for being the sole 
authority to define and interpret the understanding of Indonesian nationalism in its 
official version of the nation’s history. This is particularly true in the era of military 
regime under Suharto. In the context of the national motto Bhineka Tunggal Ika or 
Unity in Diversity, the regime’s understanding of Indonesian nationalism emphasized 
the unitary element of nationalism (tunggal) and underplayed the pluralistic features  
(bhineka) of the Indonesian people in order to preserve the notion of unity. 
The obsession towards unity was most likely due to the regime’s pragmatic 
means to establish its status quo by legitimizing themselves as the sole legitimate 
guardian of the Indonesian state. Suharto’s military regime became the only interpreter 
of the state ideology of Pancasila while other interpretations were banned for public 
discourse. The assimilation of Chinese Indonesians was a part of the homogenization 
of national identity in order to strengthen the unitarian character of the nation. In this 
context, the Chinese were expected to belittle or abandon their distinct “cultural” 
identity to adopt a “national” one. 
This is one of the reasons why the notion of integration is so appealing as an 
alternative to assimilation: it does not require someone to alter her ethnic, religious, or 
cultural identity as long as she performs a commitment to the nation itself. It 
celebrated pluralism where many different groups of people shared one national 
identity without underplaying their other identities, including those based on belief, 
ethnicity, or culture. To the Chinese, this was a framework that embraced them in the 
idea of an Indonesian nation where national identity does not conflict with their 
cultural, religious, as well as ethnic identities. 
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Benny Setiono emphasized over and over again the importance of being able to 
practice Chinese culture and traditions as an expression of cultural identity. This is 
indeed the core of INTI’s mission, which is: 
 
“… to gather as many Chinese Indonesians to be integrated into the 
Indonesian nation in a holistic manner without abandoning our identity as 
Chinese. Together with other (ethnic groups) to build this nation, contribute 
in all fields without being shy of being Chinese. It is us who must position 
ourselves as an integral part of the nation.”287
 
 
Thus, the post-Suharto Chinese movements should be considered as a part of a 
nationalist movement that is not chauvinistic in character. More importantly, however, 
is that they advocate a re-definition on the popular understanding of nationalism 
among the non-Chinese majority. It is a definition that stresses on pluralism embodied 
in the integration approach, which was the prevailing view among the Peranakan 
Chinese organizations during the liberal democracy era from 1950 to 1957. Integration 
serves as a philosophical common ground for different Chinese organizations in the 
post-Suharto era. This advocacy of integration based on pluralism opens an avenue to 
re-interpret the understanding of Pancasila as the national ideology, which contextual 
interpretation was dominated by the New Order government for 32 years. 
 
Re-imagining Chinese Indonesians 
The Chinese movements revived the spirit of integration as the solution to the 
Chinese Problem. Integration provides a space for distinct Chinese cultural and 
religious identities within the framework of Indonesian national identity. This 
nationalist commitment is most clearly stated in the Preamble of INTI’s constitution: 
 
“History has recorded that the Chinese have been in Nusantara (the 
Indonesian Archipelago) for centuries and have participated in enriching the 
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life of the Motherland in various aspects of life, including the fields of 
religion, socio-culture, politics, economics, and commerce… The birth of the 
Indonesian Republic is a result of the struggle of all Indonesian people 
including the Chinese, and therefore the Chinese is an integral part of the 
Indonesian nation.”288
 
 
The statement above emphasizes historical experience while undermining 
geographical origin as the common ground of an Indonesian identity. This 
interpretation of Indonesian nationalism is constructive for the Chinese cause for at 
least two reasons. First of all, few Indonesians would disprove the importance of a 
shared experience during the struggle for independence as a key factor for the 
conception of Indonesian national identity. Second, the involvement of the Chinese in 
the Indonesian national revolution, despite the fact that pro-Indonesian independence 
was the smallest faction in Chinese politics at the time, is still a historical fact that no 
Indonesians can deny. Thus, historical revisionism became a crucial part to improve 
Chinese-non-Chinese relationship in the country. 
The bottom-line message is the following: what separated the Chinese from 
Indonesian nationhood today is the legacy of the colonial social system, a policy that 
was re-adopted by the Suharto regime. This notion is a direct attempt to counter the 
argument that the Chinese had historically benefited from the Dutch colonial system 
due to their Foreign Oriental status. To change such paradigm, the Chinese did at least 
two things: first was an attempt to explain that they have been a part of Indonesian 
society even before colonialism took hold; second, they emphasized their 
predecessors’ involvement in the national struggle for Indonesian independence. In 
other words, socializing historical revisions was a major part of these organizations’ 
agenda. 
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References to the Chinese role in Indonesian history is widely present in ethnic 
Chinese publications such as Sinergi Indonesia magazine and INTI’s official monthly 
magazine Suara Baru. One example is a column in each edition of Suara Baru entitled 
“Do You Know?” (“Tahukah Anda?”) that informs less known historical facts about 
the Chinese in Indonesia.289 One of the more popular new claims about the Chinese 
among Pribumi Indonesians is the argument that eight out of the historical nine 
Muslim saints, known as the Wali Songo, were of ethnic Chinese descent.290 This is a 
big and potentially controversial claim due to the fact that the 15th century saints were 
viewed as responsible in spreading Islam to be the dominant religion in Java. Another 
symbolic historical finding is that about Admiral Cheng Ho, the 15th century Ming 
Dynasty fleet admiral and explorer who was believed to had visited Sumatra and 
particularly Java, where some of his sailors remained and spread the religion of Islam 
in predominantly Hindu/Buddhist areas.291
Perhaps one might not notice immediately the relationship between these 
historical references with the attempt to integrate the Chinese into Indonesian 
nationhood, especially if one accepts the concept of a nation as a modern, post-
colonial entity and phenomenon. This would lead one to view that the pre-colonial 
society had little or no direct correlation with the creation of the modern Indonesian 
national identity. If one observes a bit further, however, these historical references do 
have profound relationship with the general understanding of Indonesian nationhood. 
It is hard to deny, first of all, that the symbolic aspect of these historical references do 
affect the predominantly Pribumi Muslim Indonesian psyche, as these references 
challenge the stereotypical images that the Chinese have nothing to do with Islam and 
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Muslims throughout Indonesian history. More importantly, however, modern 
Indonesian nationalism was partly built based on the idea that the Indonesian nation is 
a continuation of pre-colonial political entities, particularly the great empires of 
Srivijaya and Majapahit.292
The notion that the Chinese have been a part of the pre-colonial Indonesian 
society is indeed highlighted in the contemporary socialization of Chinese Indonesian 
history. During the interview with Benny Setiono, he began our conversation with a 
brief history of the Chinese in Indonesia, in which he pointed the fact that the Chinese 
have been in the Indonesian archipelago perhaps one thousand years before the 
Europeans arrived, and that they had no problem being a part of the multi-cultural 
societies.
 The period of colonialism is seen as an interruption of 
Pribumi rules over the archipelago; thus Indonesian nationalism is often depicted as 
the return to the nation’s glorious past. For the Chinese to be a part of the pre-colonial 
past, therefore, suggests a more intimate historical association with Pribumi 
Indonesians, and thus a part of the Indonesian nation. 
293
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Lieus Sungkarisma also shared the view that the Chinese Problem is a colonial 
legacy in an interview with Sinergi Indonesia. Responding to the question why 
Chinese Indonesians are seen as exclusive, he blamed 32 years of Suharto rule for 
“historical distortion” (penyimpangan sejarah) by not giving ethnic Chinese the credit 
for their participation in Indonesian nation building. He said: 
 
“Since 1928 the Chinese have been involved (in national independence 
movement), there were four (Chinese) people involved in the Youth Pledge 
and yet not many people know (about it). There were four people who were a 
part of the BPUPKI (a committee founded in April 1945 formed by the 
Japanese to grant independence to Indonesia) and there are very few 
Indonesians know about these facts… Society view the Chinese as un-
nationalistic because historical facts are (hidden), while the ones being 
exposed are (negative images such as the case of) Eddi Tanzil (a former 
Suharto crony who becomes the main suspect for a corruption scandal)… but 
no one sees who were behind Eddi Tanzil’s success stealing Bapindo (the 
targeted bank)’s money.”294
 
 
Aside from history, the two Chinese Indonesian magazines also served as 
vehicles to change the stereotypical images of Chinese Indonesians in everyday lives. 
For example, Sinergi Indonesia often contains a section of picture articles about poor 
Chinese communities around the archipelago, entitled, “Not all Chinese are Rich”. It 
displays images of Chinese communities in poverty stricken areas such as in the town 
of Singkawang, West Kalimantan295 or Tanggerang, Banten Province.296
Perhaps the most symbolic of all attempts to socialize alternative 
understanding of Indonesian nationhood is most embodied in a project by PSMTI. In 
2002, Teddy Jusuf on behalf of his organization submitted a proposal to build a 
Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park (Taman Budaya Tionghoa Indonesia) that is to be 
 It is a bold 
attempt that targets directly to the stereotypical Chinese-rich and Pribumi-poor image. 
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located at Taman Mini or the “Miniature Garden”, the Indonesian version of a cultural 
park that displays cultural representations from each province in Indonesia. Taman 
Mini was the brainchild of Madame Tien Suharto, the late Indonesian First Lady. As it 
was inaugurated in 1975, the cultural park dedicates a pavilion for each of Indonesia’s 
then 26 provinces, where that province’s traditional clothing, dances and traditions are 
depicted and displayed inside a cultural house built in traditional architecture. As of 
2008, the Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park project was still under construction, 
having finished only the Chinese gate as the entrance of the park. This is largely due to 
the lack of funds, but the idea of the park itself was what sparked controversy over 
what it means to be Indonesian. 
James T. Siegel wrote, “We do not have a word to characterize Taman Mini. It 
is a “theme park” a la Walt Disney. But it is more than that because it is also a 
museum, claiming to hold “authentic” features of the Indonesian past.”297 The mission 
of this institution, as stated by the park’s General Manager, was “to be a vehicle for 
the presentation and development of Indonesian culture and as a means to strengthen 
the unity and integrity of the people of Indonesia.”298 Indeed, as noticed by Kyoto 
University’s Yuki Kitamura, Taman Mini is the visual presentation of the official 
nationalism as defined by Suharto’s New Order regime by “packaging ethnicity with 
wedding clothes, dances, and the authority of Taman Mini.”299
                                                 
297 Siegel, James T. Fetish, Recognition, Revolution. Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1997 (4) 
 In the vision of Taman 
Mini, cultures are presented in a certain way that each province has a fixed, unique, 
homogenous culture within itself and distinct from other provinces. Each has its 
unique traditional house or rumah adat, dances, clothing, and so on. The claim to 
authenticity is largely indebted to the fact that Taman Mini was built by the state, or at 
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least was recognized by the state, which was the sole interpreter of the definition of 
nationalism. 
More importantly, however, Taman Mini excludes the Arab, Indian, 
Caucasian, and Chinese Indonesians in its representation of Indonesian cultures. This, 
one might argue, is due to the fact that the ancestral geographical origin of these 
minority groups are not a part of the Indonesian “geo-body,” to use Thai historian 
Tongchai Winichakul’s term.300 The geo-body itself is clearly represented in Taman 
Mini - right in the center of the park is an eight-hectare pond filled with islands that 
are shaped like the map of the Indonesian archipelago. Above and across the pond is a 
cable train that would give visitors a “proper perspective” from above.301 As all the 
provinces of Indonesia are a part of that particular map, so are the customs, traditions, 
and cultures of those provinces. Thus, the pond in the middle of the park is a statement 
that to be a part of this nation, one’s ancestral home must be within the geographical 
border of modern Indonesia. Therefore, if other ethnic groups “can go home”302
Therefore, the idea to add a Chinese section in the park itself is indeed 
revolutionary because it completely disregards the concept of official nationalism that 
Taman Mini stood for. This project also opened a public discourse about Indonesian 
nationalism once more. The Jakarta Post opened its article about the Chinese 
Indonesian Cultural Park with the following questions: 
 to the 
traditional houses displayed in Taman Mini, the minority groups mentioned above 
cannot do the same because their ancestral origin is not geographically within the 
Indonesian map. 
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“What does it mean to be a “Chinese Indonesian”? Who are they? What 
journey did they take to become part of the nation? What contributions have 
they made to this country? These are some of the questions awaiting answers 
as the Chinese-Indonesian Cultural Park is being constructed at Taman Mini 
Indonesia Indah (TMII) in East Jakarta.”303
 
 
Furthermore the article stated that PSMTI’s “selection as the venue for the 
Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park was meant to enhance the recognition of Chinese 
Indonesian ethnicity by the state and its acceptance by the Indonesian people… 
PSMTI believes that creating a museum within Taman Mini ensures a place for 
Chinese Indonesian ethnicity in the Indonesian nation.”304
Interestingly, Kitamura views the Chinese Indonesian’s attempt to include their 
cultural heritage into Taman Mini as an attempt to assimilate, not integrate, 
themselves into Indonesian society. She noted, “The Chinese Indonesian Cultural Park 
can thus be seen as a belated assimilation into the Suharto regime’s ethnicity 
policy.”
 
305
Yet, I would argue that this symbolic representation could be viewed as a 
means to achieve integration as the final goal. There are no other more effective ways 
for PSMTI to enter the public imagination about nationalism than through Taman 
Mini. This is mainly because most Indonesians are not aware on the politicization of 
Taman Mini itself; they see the garden as a genuinely educational tool to introduce the 
cultures of Indonesia, and thus they take the representation of the Indonesian nation 
for granted. Taman Mini is a tool of imagining a political community par-excellence, 
 This statement may contradict the thesis of this study that the contemporary 
Chinese Indonesian movements are based on the notion of integration, and not 
assimilation attempt. 
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as even many of the most politically conscious Indonesians may not be aware of its 
politicization. The Suharto regime is indeed successful in controlling popular 
imagination of the nation-state through its official nationalism. 
After successfully penetrating popular imagination, then PSMTI began with its 
integration project. The integration aspect was depicted in the architectural and visual 
representation of the park buildings itself - PSMTI chose to hire a team of Chinese 
architecture consultants who are employed by the municipality of Xiamen in Fujian 
province, China.306 This decision has sparked a debate “over whether the park will be 
able to supply a complete picture of the diverse Chinese-Indonesian culture.”307 
University of Indonesia architecture professor Gunawan Tjahjono told The Jakarta 
Post that local architects who understand the history of Peranakan Chinese should be 
engaged instead. He labeled the decision to hire Chinese consultants as “ignorant” 
because they disregard many local historians who “understand better what has really 
happened in the lives of Chinese Indonesians.”308
PSMTI defended their decision by explaining that it is their attempt to exhibit 
within those Chinese buildings various documents, artifacts, and general descriptions 
on where they originally migrated from, how they lived, and their interaction with 
surroundings, including the Chinese’s involvement in the independence war. The main 
message is that the content of these authentic Chinese buildings is after all about 
Chinese Indonesians. Tedy Jusuf added, “We have to be extreme in portraying it 
(Chinese architecture) because the whole idea of TMII is to preserve the original 
culture of the ethnic groups in Indonesia.”
 
309
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 Jusuf’s reasoning resonates with the 
comment of 17 year-old Cynthia who, as quoted by The Jakarta Post article, expressed 
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her interest to visit the park so “those who cannot go to the country of origin, China, 
can get an idea of it.”310
 
 Indeed, Chinese Indonesians can “go home” to their own 
section of cultural park in Taman Mini, just like most other Indonesians. 
Self-Evaluation 
Surely, this new understanding of Indonesian identity as promoted by the 
Chinese movements is potentially controversial. The controversy over the Chinese 
Indonesian Cultural Park, for instance, indicates that PSMTI is exploring a vague 
territory where non-Chinese may perceive their actions as a reflection of growing 
Chinese chauvinism. This is certainly a valid assumption because of the fact that 
resentment against the Chinese has taken such a deep root in Indonesian society, so it 
is most wise to assume that such resentment still exists even in the post-Suharto era. 
Perhaps anti-Chinese sentiments were silenced because of the spirit of Reformasi and 
due to the public sympathy toward the Chinese victims in May 1998 Riots. Thus, the 
confidence in celebrating political, social, or cultural practices within the Chinese 
movements may trigger such resentment to gain audience again. 
Therefore, it is important for Chinese Indonesian activists to continuously 
reflect on their own movements in order to do avoid anti-Chinese sentiments to rise 
again. An example of such self-reflection is a speech delivered by Benny Setiono in a 
discussion forum entitled the “Ethnic Chinese Forum into the Mainstream Population” 
(Forum Etnis Tionghoa Masuk ke Dalam Mainstream Bangsa) at the City University 
of Hong Kong. 
In his speech Setiono criticized several aspects of the Chinese Indonesian 
movements. One of them regarded the relatively low interest in the Chinese 
movements itself among the Chinese communities: 
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“Most Peranakans do not feel the need or importance to form or join Chinese 
dominated organizations. They prefer to join organizations which are 
national in scope such as Lions Club, Rotary Club, or other professional as 
well as political organizations. They are also generally more interested with 
religious organizations such as Christian, Catholic, Buddhist, Confucian, and 
even Islamic (organizations).”311
 
 
Another problem he mentioned was the “excessive freedom” of Chinese 
organizations, including by the leaders of INTI, referring to the lavish activities such 
as parties and gatherings “without considering the economic situation where millions 
of Indonesian people are still suffering from poverty and the gap between the rich and 
the poor are widening.”312
Interestingly, his criticism also put a spotlight on another sensitive subject 
within the Chinese Indonesian movement namely, the relationship between ethnic 
Chinese Indonesians and Mainland China. Setiono mentioned that, in every event, an 
official from the Chinese Embassy is always invited to give an opening speech in 
Mandarin, while officials from the Indonesian government are rarely invited. Setiono 
asserted: 
 
 
“The problem is that the pictures of their events will appear in Chinese daily 
newspapers especially the international Daily News. Meanwhile the 
government intelligence always monitors the activities of Chinese 
Indonesians through these daily publications.”313
 
 
Lastly, regarding to several Totok organizations, Setiono stated: 
 
“… these organizations are used as vehicles by their leaders for their own 
interest to become celebrities and to be included on the list of Chinese 
“figures” (“tokoh” Tionghoa) in the eyes of the Totok community, the (PRC) 
Embassy and the Chinese government.”314
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Such publicity, he added, may grant them awards from Chinese officials and 
concession or priorities and, more importantly, certain accommodations for business 
opportunities in China. 
While there may be further explanations that justify the close relationships 
between these organizations with the Chinese government, Setiono’s criticism should 
be valued for its ability to contemplate on actions that may be considered as sensitive 
for the Indonesian non-Chinese majority. Every Chinese Indonesian involved in these 
organizations should be well aware about how revolutionary and potentially 
controversial their movements are from historical perspective, not least because of the 
movements’ past experience such as that with Baperki. Furthermore, Setiono’s attack 
on business opportunists who use the movements for their own interests is critically 
important, since one of the strongest stigma against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia is that 
they are the so-called “economic animals.” Such behavior mentioned above does not 
only provoke such stigma to gain momentum again, but can also shatter the very 
objective of the movement. 
Another important aspect, however, is the fact that such criticisms are openly 
available in public as they have been published by Sinergi Indonesia magazine. As 
one of the most recognizable individuals within the Chinese communities in 
Indonesia, Setiono’s criticism toward the successful Peranakan entrepreneurs’ apathy 
and Totok entrepreneurs’ greediness is in itself revolutionary as it indicates that, in a 
post-Suharto era, Chinese Indonesians have the opportunity to conduct checks and 
balances toward their own communities. This was not possible under the New Order 
regime due to their political impotence, and thus it should be celebrated a positive 
development within Chinese Indonesian politics. 
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Above all, Setiono’s criticism is a reminder for the need to maintain a delicate 
balance between the “diversity” and the “unity” of the Indonesian nation. What 
Setiono evaluates is a tendency to exploit the notion of pluralism that grows among 
Chinese Indonesians in the past few years. This tendency can be viewed as a reversed 
form of Suharto’s strategy that exploited the notion of ‘unity’ at the expense of 
‘diversity’ in order to achieve stability and status quo. The balance between unity and 
diversity is the essence of Indonesian national identity, and therefore lies in the center 
of the Chinese Indonesian movements. Such self-criticism should be a part of the 
Chinese Indonesian activism in order to maintain the main objective of the 
movements. This is a key aspect for the Chinese Indonesian movements to continue in 
the future. 
What can be concluded from these contemporary movements is what Dr. I 
Wibowo Wibisono, chairman of the University of Indonesia’s Centre for Chinese 
studies, called a trend for liberalization.315
This process began as a reaction toward the violence against ethnic Chinese 
Indonesians in May 1998, but then gradually evolved into a series of movements that 
attempt to solve the Chinese Problem in a holistic manner. Along with it occurs the 
evolution of the movements’ objectives from focusing on immediate goals, such as 
helping the victims of May 1998 violence and demanding justice, to struggling to 
revisit the definition of Indonesian national identity in order to change the majority’s 
view toward them. In short, their movements have contributed to a much larger scope 
 They can be understood as an attempt to 
redefine their “Chinese-ness” in the eyes of the majority in order to gain recognition as 
true members of an Indonesian national identity. It is a dynamic process where the 
community, which consists of highly diverse sub-communities, must redefine their 
own understanding about themselves. 
                                                 
315 Ilham Khoiri, “I Wibowo Tentang Liberalisasi Masyarakat Tionghoa,” Kompas, February 10, 2008. 
117 
of discourse about how to define an Indonesian national identity, a discourse that has 
been forgotten during the Suharto era. 
Through these movements the notion of integration toward national identity is 
reborn. The majority of Chinese organizations embrace integration as the main 
doctrine of their movement, and the later part of this chapter has demonstrated how 
different organizations attempt to implement integrative approach into Indonesian 
society. The ultimate end of all these activities, from the demand for equal rights to the 
philosophical discourse on Indonesian identity, is ultimately to promote the rights of 
ethnic Chinese as Indonesian nationals. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This study attempts to analyze and interpret the essence of the Chinese 
Indonesian movements in the post Suharto Era. It mainly focuses on the relationship 
between these activisms and the Chinese’s new understanding of their Indonesian 
identity. In other words, it is primarily interested in how the ethnic Chinese minority 
group in the Reform Era attempted to define themselves as Indonesians to justify 
their demand for equal rights as a part of the nation. This study argues for the 
historical importance of these movements as they represent a radical change that 
took place in a democratizing society. 
There are many aspects of the movements that this study does not discuss. 
First of all, it does not elaborate on its discussion of the participation of ethnic 
Chinese in the political scene, which is one of the most important and symbolic 
changes in the lives of this minority group in post-Suharto Indonesia. It only notes 
that there has not been a political figure of Chinese descent that appeals to the grass-
root majority Indonesians, since until today ethnic Chinese politicians are commonly 
known only among the middle upper urban class and intellectuals. The emergence of 
an ethnic Chinese politician with massive Pribumi support would be a major 
indicator that ethnic tension between Chinese and Pribumi has significantly 
decreased. The possibility for the emergence of such a figure, along with the socio-
political aspects that would come long with it, is an interesting topic for future 
research. 
Furthermore, due to limitation of data and research, this study primarily 
observes the Chinese’s political participation only in the urban areas while barely 
discussing those in the rural areas or provincial level. The author is aware, however, 
that there have been several ethnic Chinese officials and candidates in provincial and 
local governments across the archipelago. Political participation in the provincial 
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level may be the best avenue for ethnic Chinese to merge themselves into Indonesian 
politics, as the career in provincial government becomes more attractive particularly 
after economic decentralization in 2004. This can be an interesting and useful topic 
for future research in order to give another view of the Chinese Indonesian 
movements. 
Another important but often-overlooked aspect of change is the role of 
popular culture as a medium to the new acceptance of ethnic Chinese in Indonesian 
society. Post - Suharto era popular culture has not only been enriched by the 
appearance of ethnic Chinese Indonesian musicians, actresses, and TV personalities, 
but also popular culture commodities from Taiwan and Hong Kong. The most 
celebrated of all is perhaps the boom of F4-Mania in 2003-2004, the Taiwanese so-
called “boy-bands” who became the idols of non-Chinese Indonesian teenagers. 
Other examples include the popularity of Chinese beauty pageant contests in 
provinces with a large number of ethnic Chinese minorities. The popular culture 
phenomenon is arguably among the earliest symbols of change with regards to 
acceptance of the Indonesian public toward ethnic Chinese. The relationship between 
popular culture and the Chinese movements is surely an interesting and noteworthy 
topic to explore. 
Perhaps the most important subject that has not been largely explored is the 
relationship between Chinese Indonesian organizations and the PRC. There are so 
many aspects that can be thoroughly researched including social, political, and 
economic aspects of such relationship. I am most interested in examining the 
relationship through an anthropological perspective, particularly using the 
framework of Aihwa Ong’s concept of transnational identity from her book Flexible 
Citizenship (1999). Perhaps it is through this framework that the notion of Chinese 
“chauvinism” can be explained in a different perspective. 
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The story of ethnic Chinese Indonesian movements is about the struggle for 
recognition of their identity as a minority in the Indonesian society. No other ethnic 
group has experienced what the Chinese did throughout the nation’s history. The 
traditional stigma of Chinese identity is that of an opportunist outsider with no 
loyalty to Indonesia. As we saw in Chapter 1, animosity against the Chinese can be 
traced back to the colonial period. During the Sukarno Era, their ambiguous status of 
citizenship between that of China and of Indonesia led to physical displacements of 
the Chinese and scrutiny among Indonesians toward the Chinese’s national loyalty. 
Furthermore, the spirit of revolution evolved into a form of economic nationalism 
among many Pribumi Indonesians who sought an end to Chinese Indonesian 
economic dominance. The end of the Sukarno era saw the emergence of the New 
Order regime that antagonized communist China as well as the Chinese in Indonesia. 
The Chinese Indonesian Movement during the Reform Era was without a 
doubt a turning point in the history of ethnic Chinese communities in Indonesia. It 
was the first time that socio-political atmosphere in Indonesia allows the Chinese to 
openly explain themselves as a community, express their heterogeneous Chinese 
socio-cultural identities, and at the same time demand equal rights as Indonesian 
citizens without widespread scrutiny. Such is a freedom that had never been granted 
by the indigenous government and people before, even since Indonesia gained their 
national independence.  
What should be highlighted from the Chinese Indonesian Movements, 
however, is the way they challenge the very definition of Indonesian national identity 
itself. The effect of 32 years of New Order rule has crystallized the way the 
Indonesian majority interpreted nationalism. The Chinese, on the other hand, were 
continuously being challenged by the status quo’s interpretation of national identity. 
Due to this constant challenge, the Chinese were the ones who realized early on that 
Indonesian nationalism can and should be interpreted differently, namely by putting 
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more weight on the notion of pluralism so that it is in balance with the notion of 
unity.  
It is true that discrimination against them still exists in today’s society, which 
prevents them from being treated equally. At the same time, it is critical for Chinese 
Indonesians to remember that, while continuing their struggle to achieve equal rights, 
they must maintain their identity as Indonesians by continuing to participate in 
nation building and prevent the rise of Chinese chauvinism among themselves.  
The story of the Chinese Indonesian Movements is a prime example of 
drastic social reform as a result of the democratization of a nation. What democracy 
has brought to all Indonesians, Chinese and non-Chinese alike, is a continuous 
discourse of what it means to be a part of the Indonesian nation, a discourse that was 
discontinued by the New Order regime for 32 years. The Chinese are at the frontline 
of this discourse due to their position in Indonesian society, and their movements 
will continue to challenge the way Indonesians understand their national identity for 
years to come. 
 
